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From 1945 to 1949, Indonesian nationalists struggled
for independence against their Dutch colonial rulers.

For

most of the period, American foreign policy favored the
Netherlands in its desire to reign once again over the
archipelago.

American foreign policy strategy advocated a

"Europe first" position, and possessed finite resources to
contain Soviet expansion in the developing cold war. State
Department policy planners sided with European powers as
they attempted to resume the status quo ante in Southeast
Asia following World War II.

Colonies were considered

essential to the recoveries of Western European powers
economically, politically, and psychologically.
While the American cold war strategy worked to
stabilize Western Europe against Soviet advances, it
resulted in negative affects in Asia in general and
Indonesia in particular.

Much goodwill toward the United

States, easily obtained from Asian nationalists who desired
to follow American principles, evaporated as the American
anti-colonial position announced during World War II turned
hollow in its aftermath.

Yet an examination of Department of State Records, as
well as the papers of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., former
Secretary of State during the Truman administration, and
Frank Graham, American representative to the United Nations
committee to negotiate Indonesian independence, does not
yield a united American front that was blind to Asian
nationalism and determined to allow the pre-World War II
status quo.

Rather, debate over American policy was heated

and prolonged.

American officials were well aware of many

of the potential negative consequences of their policy. As
fighting erupted twice in Indonesia in the late 1940s and
all exports of Indonesian natural resources to Europe
stopped, American foreign policy shifted away from
supporting the Netherlands in favor of the Indonesian
nationalists.

Dutch attempts at regaining control of

Indonesia threatened the European Recovery Program by both
exhausting the limited resources of the Netherlands in a
protracted colonial war, and prompting anti-Dutch
legislation in the United States Senate that imperiled all
Marshall Plan aid for Western Europe.
To their credit, American policy makers were flexible
enough to shift to supporting Indonesian nationalism.
Pressure on the Dutch through the threat of withholding all
economic aid ensured the Netherlands' return to talks and
subsequent Indonesian independence.
did understand Asian nationalism.

American foreign policy
The United States-

Indonesian relationship was one of calculated risks and
negative consequences in the American pursuit of an overall
strategy of containment in the cold war period that happily
did not degenerate into military conflict involving United
States troops in a war to deny Indonesian independence.
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Introduction

The archipelago known as Indonesia comprises over
17,000 islands, of which some four thousand are inhabited.
In both area and population, the Republic of Indonesia is
the largest country of Southeast Asia.

With a population

now over 200 million, only the People's Republic of China,
India, and the United States are more populous.

Indonesia

has a land area of 736,000 square miles and extends over
3,000 miles from northwestern Sumatra to southeastern West
Irian.

The archipelago is comprised of six main islands or

island groups:

Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi (Celebes),

Kalimantan (Borneo), Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sunda Islands),
and the Moluccas.

Much of the land is mountainous, with a

central range running the length of the archipelago.
Although Indonesia is a tropical country entirely within
eleven degrees of the equator, the heat is tempered by the
mountain elevations and ocean winds.

There are two

recognizable seasons: wet (from November to March) and dry
(from April to October).
For centuries the island chain served as a bridge
between the continents of Asia and Australia.

As a

crossroads for many of the world's sea and air routes
1
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connecting Australia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the
waters surrounding Indonesia funnel 80 percent of all Asian
trade.

The straits of Malacca, Makassar, and Karimata are

of immense strategic importance.

While the centers of these

straits are listed as international waters and honored as
such by the Indonesian government, traditional feelings are
that these waters are part of Indonesia.
·The people of Indonesia are racially and culturally
mixed.

There are over twenty major ethnic and linguistic

groups and hundreds of dialects.
predominantly Malay in origin.

The people are
Other important racial

groups are the Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and Europeans.

Of

the minority groups, the Chinese are the largest and face
the most discrimination.
Ninety percent of the population is Muslim, but the
influences of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity,
Confucianism, and animism modify Islamic practice.

More

than 8 percent are Christians, concentrated in northern
Sumatra and northern Sulawesi.

Most of the people of Bali

have retained a form of the ancient Hindu religion, which is
an amalgamation of Indian Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism
from empires around 1000 A.D.
the remote interior.

Animists are still found in

The Muslim population is concentrated

on the islands of Java and Madura.

Java is the home of over

two-thirds of all Indonesians, and this concentration has
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led to uneven distribution of Indonesia's population,
causing economic problems and retarded growth.
Although economically underdeveloped, Indonesia
possesses enormous resources.

The islands are the world's

largest supplier of natural rubber.

Light crude oil

provides the Indonesian government with much revenue, and
the nation possesses 80 percent of all timberland in
Southeast Asia.
in the world.

Indonesia is second in tin ore production
It also has large reserves of coal and

bauxite for aluminum.

Combined with a growing tourist

industry, a large rice industry, and the traditional
plantation economy from colonial days, it is blessed with
tremendous potential for growth.
Since independence from Dutch rule in 1949, the
national language has been Bahasa Indonesia, a revised form
of Malayan with elements adopted from various Indonesian
local dialects, Sanskrit, Dutch, and Arabic.

This unique

language is spun from the fabric of a distinctive Indonesian
culture that uses as its slogan ''Unity in Diversity"
(Bhineka Tunggal Ika.)

Indonesia attempted to remain

neutral in the East-West struggle between the Soviet Union
and the United States, and willingly accepted aid from both
sides.
This analysis of Indonesian internal and foreign policy
in the period 1943-1949 makes it clear that the developing
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cold war was decisive in shaping the United States
government's relations with Indonesia.

Strongly

nationalistic and wary of Western colonialism, Indonesia at
the time was a Dutch colony in turmoil closely monitored by
the United States because of its size, potential strength
and strategic location.

The history of United States-

Indonesian relations during the period under investigation
is that of one government and one nationalist, republican
independence movement pursuing divergent, and at times
seemingly incompatible policies.

On the one hand, Indonesia

treasured independence from Dutch control and aspired to be
a sovereign, non-aligned state at a time of a bi-polar world
controlled by superpowers.

For its part, the United States

saw Indonesia's strong growth potential and desired a strong
partnership.
American concerns about Indonesia's independence
movement equaling de facto communist control, and its
prioritization of Europe as the most important place to stop
communist expansion, led to initial American support of
Dutch re-colonization.

This strategy fueled political

instability in Indonesia.

American support of the Dutch

ensured rough relations between the countries during the
1940s and the early years of the Indonesian republic.
According to most observers, American foreign policy in
the post-war era had a set of priorities that conflicted
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with independence movements all over the world.

Soviet

encroachment was the problem and weakness and instability in
former European colonial areas that were now newly
independent promoted Soviet aggression.

The United States

attempted to fill these power vacuums and promote stability
in new countries that would benefit its aims.
World War II created this new interventionist consensus
among American leaders. The buildup of large military forces
to fight the war made United States policy makers global in
outlook.

Following the war, the United States was the

dominant world power and felt compelled to use its power to
foster friendly regimes in those countries.

The American

government often ended up enforcing, at least temporarily,
the status quo ante by supporting colonial powers like
Britain, France, and in Indonesia, the Netherlands.
American policy in Asia was more problematical because
of the attitude American policy makers brought to issues at
that time.

American foreign policy experts believed that

the contest between it and the Soviet bloc was a zero-sum
game.

That is, a win for one side was a loss for the other.

The State Department's definition of communist movements
was so broad, that almost any successful insurgency was
interpreted as a victory for the Soviets and a loss for the
United States.

In this climate, the desires of a

strategically vital Indonesia to be independent and non-
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aligned was simply not going to be tolerated by the American
national security apparatus.
United States-Indonesian relations 1943-1949
illustrated many of the negative consequences of American
cold war strategy that would become more exaggerated in the
coming years.

The clash between American national security

managers and Indonesian nationalist leaders served to extend
the length of Indonesian turmoil.

Time and again Indonesian

moderates struggling to execute their strategy of diplomasi
instead of armed resistance, only to have the United States
pro-Dutch neutrality weaken their leadership among the
Indonesian ruling coalition.

By exhausting all of their

political capital in their negotiations with the Dutch,
republican moderates in Indonesia found it difficult to
remain in control of the nationalist movement.

Moderate

policies became too closely associated with western
influence, reminded Indonesians of Dutch colonialism, and
thus became untenable political positions for even President
Sukarno, leader of the Indonesian nationalist movement since
the 1920s and the country's foremost orator, statesman and
national leader.
As Sukarno drifted leftward in his politics by
including members of the communist PKI in his ruling
coalition, and accepted increasing amounts of military aid
from eastern bloc countries under the influence of the
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Soviet Union, American foreign policy experts decided on a
covert operation in 1958.

By supporting the conservative

military and political leaders in Indonesia, the Eisenhower
administration sought to prevent possible Soviet and Chinese
communist influence in Indonesian affairs.

The operation

failed and was discovered by the Indonesian government.
Sukarno claimed that the United States government had
violated Indonesian sovereignty and the incident soured
United States-Indonesian relations until the Indonesian
president's fall from power in a military coup in 1965. 1

1

Information on Indonesian history and culture can be
found in J. D. Legge, Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs:
PrenticeHall, 1964), 1-123; Robert van Niel, "The Course of
Indonesian History," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New
Haven:
Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1963), 279297; Ailsa Zainu'ddin, A Short History of Indonesia (New
York:
Praeger, 1970), 94-197; Leslie Palmier, Indonesia (New
York:
Walker, 1965), 39-94; George McTurnan Kahin,
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca:
Cornell
University Press, 1952), 3-93; Bernhard Dahm, History of
Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York:
Praeger,
1971), 1-70. An interpretation of the United States'
approach to Third World revolutions can be found in Richard
Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (New York:
The New
American Library, 1972), 1-22.

Chapter 1
The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism

Indonesia is the product of successive migrations from
India and China.

It is a melting pot culture that features

animism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity.
Social organization shows vestiges of the aristocratic
hierarchy of early Javanese kingdoms.
left its imprint on Indonesia.

Dutch colonial rule

It improved communications

among the islands and provided an economic foundation that
began the interaction between the traditional Indonesian
environment and the West.

1

Organized Indonesian history began with two major
kingdoms: the Javanese kingdom of Mataram and the commercial
kingdom of Srivijaya on Sumatra and the outer islands.
1

Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth
Century (New York:
Praeger, 1971), 1-70; George M. Kahin,
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1962); 1-78; Legge, Indonesia, 1-128; Ruth
T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University
Southeast Asian Studies, 1963), 1-70; Leslie Palmier,
Indonesia (New York: Walker, 1965), 39-94; Ailsa Zainu'ddin,
A Short History of Indonesia (New York:
Praeger, 1970), 94197.
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Mataram existed around the eighth century and was followed
by the Buddhist dynasty of Shailendra, which produced the
great stupa of Borobodur.

These early Hindu-Javanese

kingdoms fused Indian and Buddhist faiths with their
indigenous beliefs and began the formation of a unique
Indonesian culture.

Proof is found in the shadow plays

based on Indian epic themes, the form of Javanese and
Balinese dances, and Indian motifs on traditional batik
designs and the stupa of Borobodur.
temple, but a nine-layer stupa.

It is not a tomb or

It could be called a

textbook of Buddhist beliefs through the use of relief
sculptures.

The reliefs communicate stories, and together

with the layers, symbolize an individual's stages toward
perfection.

The pyramid shape resembles a kingdom with

hierarchical order, and reveals Idonesia's Hindu and
Buddhist roots.
The Javanese states were based on wet rice cultivation
and were aristocratic and military in character.

Local

village chiefs became government servants, and tribute
collected by them was used to maintain irrigation canals.
The second kingdom of Srivijaya, on the island of
southern Sumatra, was not at all like the Javanese kingdoms.
Srivijaya was maritime in character, and its society was
much more egalitarian.

It was incorporated into the eastern

and central Javanese kingdoms during the climax of Hindu-
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Javanese civilization, the Madjapahit dynasty.

This dynasty

went beyond agriculture to include commerce and gave rise to
a new rivalry between agricultural and commercial interests
within the Indonesian state.
In the fifteenth century, Paranesvara, a refugee prince
evicted from the lands of Madjapahit, converted to Islam and
made his realm on the island of Sumatra the center of Moslem
traders in East Asia.

Commercialism and Islam became

inseparable and fueled the rivalry between Java and the
Outer Islands that was (and remains) an important factor in
current Indonesian politics.

Eventually Madjapahit was

replaced by the central Javanese kingdom of the third
Mataram, which fused Islam into the Indonesian cultural mix
for the sake of political expediency.

Hinduism became the

way of the aristocracy, and much animism remained at the
village level.

The result was tension between the customary

leaders, the Hinduisitc, aristocratic class or priyayi, and
the local, fundamentalist Islamic religious leaders, the
santri.
As the Dutch began to consolidate their hold on Java
and use the native, traditional aristocracy to control the
population, the popularity of Islam spread as a form of
resistance to colonialism.

Islam would provide the impetus

for wars against the Dutch in the 1820s and 1830s and
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provide the organization of the modern Indonesian
nationalist movement:

Sarekat Islam.

Dutch colonization meant many things for Indonesia.
Until the Dutch arrival, Indonesia could except external
influences on her own terms.

The Dutch, with the advent of

the industrial revolution, changed this condition.

By 1870,

direct Dutch investment in Indonesia had crystallized the
dichotomy between the commercial centers and the
agricultural villages, further exacerbating existing
tensions within the traditional Indonesian order.
Dutch control destroyed the Javanese trading class on
the island and isolated it from the Indonesian economy by
preventing direct contacts through international trade.
Plantation economies were erected and controlled by the
Dutch and forced deliveries of goods began.

The

aristocratic class, the priyayi, were supported by Dutch
power.
rulers.

Power proceeded from an alien government, not local
The scope of exportation of materials increased,

yet Indonesia was drawn into the world economy with little
change in village culture.
Over the next sixty years, the need for industrial
products shifted attention from Java to Sumatra..

The

extension of Dutch political authority to the outer islands
brought renewed conflicts.

The Dutch won the Atjeh War of

1878-1903, and exploitation of oil riches began.

Dutch
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consolidation of power over the outer islands henceforth
served as a unifying force for Indonesians, who in rallying
against the Dutch would overcome their own divisions.

The

power of anti-colonialism proved stronger than internal
rivalry.
Aware of growing Indonesian resistance to plantation
agriculture and other forms of Dutch dominance, the
government of the Netherlands etablished an "Ethical Policy"
for Indonesia in the 1890s.

The idea was to educate the

Indonesian elite and provide health and human services to
the indigenous population, thereby strengthening Dutch
hegemony and eliminating discontent.
Westernization was a new challenge to Indonesian
culture.

The process released dynamic forces within the

ranks of Indonesians.

The elite exposed to Western ideals

quickly applied them to their own situation and found the
Dutch wanting.

Frustrated intellectuals could not find work

or were forced into occupations they considered menial in
relation to their talents.
Dutch rule.

They began to organize against

Village life, which was disrupted by Dutch rule

and economic development, was fertile ground for converts to
the growing nationalist movement.
The "Ethical Policy" of the Dutch had unintended
effects.

It eliminated any middle class, it left villages

doomed to shared poverty, and it created an intellectual
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class without the experience necessary to run large
corporate or governmental enterprises or engage in large
scale exporting of materials. Most importantly, it kindled a
nationalist movement that would not stop until it gained
Indonesian independence from the Dutch in 1949.
Another effect of Dutch "Ethical Policy'' was the
creation of a two-tiered elite.

The first tier was the old

priyayi, kept in power by the Dutch.

The second tier was

the new elite educated in Western institutions and employed
in the expanded civil service of late Dutch colonial rule.
Neither class was happy under Dutch control, nor was either
one in agreement about how to change it.
Centuries of Dutch coaptation made the highest priyayi
on Java and their counterparts on other islands politically
conservative.

Lower ranking members of the priyayi and the

santri, stuck in occupations far below their training and
ability, were less content with the status quo.

Dutch

Liberals of the turn of the century could scarcely imagine
an independent Indonesia, but dissatisfied Indonesian
intellectuals began to work toward this end.

In 1908

students of the School for Training Native Doctors
established Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor), the first modern
political organization in Indonesia.

Budi Utomo used the

Malay language, the forerunner of the Indonesian national
language, Bahasa Indonesia.

Composed mostly of priyayi
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elite, they advocated the ideals of the West as compatible
with Javanese tradition.
Islamic movements that advocated political gain also
were gaining support.

Sarekat Islam became the first

association to garner wide membership among the common
people.

It was committed to promoting Islamic teaching and

the economic prosperity of the community.

The reformist

trend in Islam was represented by Muhammadiyah (Followers of
Muhammad) established in Yogyakarta in 1912.

Mohammad

Hatta, future vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia
and nationalist leader of the outer islands, was a member of
this powerful early group, only surpassed in numbers and
importance as a faction by the Javanese, like Sukarno, in
the Indonesian revolution of the 1940s.

Sukarno, son of a

Javanese teacher, would become the dominant Javanese leader,
and Indonesia's first president.

He would rule from the

birth of the republic in 1949 until the military coup in
1965.
The initial objectives of Muhammadiyah, were modest.
They wanted to protect Indonesian merchants from the Chinese
(whom the Dutch had allowed to dominate trade) and protect
the people from overzealous Christian missionaries so as to
spread Islam.

Sukarno would marry the daµghter of the

movement's leader, Omar Sayed Tjokroaminoto.
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By May 1914 socialism was gaining in popularity among
the intellectuals.

In that month the Indies Social

Democratic Association, ISDA, was founded by Tan Malaka in
Indonesia.

As the most radical of the groups within the

Sarekat fold, it demanded a revolution.

In May 1920 the

Communist Association of the Indies (Perserikatan Komunisi
di Hindia) or PKI was established.

The Indonesian Communist

Party was led by Tan Malaka, a former member of Sarekat
Islam.

Backed by the Communist International (Comintern) in

Moscow, the PKI used local leadership to instigate
insurrections in the early 1920s on Western Java and
Sumatra.

These uprisings were crushed by the Dutch, and the

PKI would not appear again until after Indonesian
independence.
The late 1920s also witnessed the rise of Sukarno, the
country's first truly national figure.

The son of a lower

priyayi schoolteacher and a Balinese mother, Sukarno
associated with members of Sarekat Islam in his youth,
graduated from technical college in Bandung in July 1927,
and established the PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party in May
1928.

The PNI adopted the red and white flag, Bahasa

Indonesia, and the anthem Indonesia Raya as symbols of
national unity.

The party stressed mass organization,

noncooperation with colonial authorities, and the ultimate
goal of independence.
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Sukarno had a talent for bringing together Javanese
tradition, especially the lore of wayang theatre with its
portrayals of the battle between good and evil, Islam, and
his own version of Marxism/Socialism.

He claimed that

Indonesians suffered from poverty as the result of colonial
exploitation and the islands' dependence on European and
American markets.

Sukarno wanted independence and

envisioned a future Indonesian society freed from reliance
on foreign capital.

He envisioned an egalitarian community

of people content to perpetuate the values of the
traditional village, and the notion of gotong-royong (mutual
self-help) .
Minangkabau Sutan Sjahrir and Mohammad Hatta became
Sukarno's most important political rivals.

Graduates of

Dutch universities, they were social democrats in outlook.
Their political style was more rational than Sukarno's, whom
they criticized for his romanticism and preoccupation with
rousing the masses.

In December 1931 they established the

new PNI or Indonesian National Education Party.

They wanted

a gradualist education process to expand the Indonesian
political consciousness. 2
In the late 1920s and early 1930s the Dutch. hardened
their attitude in the face of growing Indonesiin demands for
independence.
2

Ibid.

Sukarno was arrested in December 1929, found
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guilty of sedition, and imprisoned.
was dissolved.

In April 1931 the PKI

The Indonesia Party, Partindo, established

soon after, was also suppressed and dissolved in May 1934.
The discriminatory policies of the Dutch had taken on
many forms by the 1930s.

Dutch social discrimination and

arrogance infuriated Indonesians whose abilities, class and
educational background were superior to those of their
European rulers.

3

Judicial administration and penal

legislation were heavily discriminatory.

Islanders were

restricted to inferior courts managed by executive officers,
not judges.
detention.

4

Indonesians could be held in preventative
Netherlands bureaucrats held a monopoly on

professional positions.

Indonesian government employees

received lower rates of pay, and received inferior
educational facilities at higher tuition rates.

It became

increasingly clear to Indonesians that the Dutch were there
to exploit them and nationalism blossomed. 5
In response, the Dutch heightened their oppression of
Indonesians.

At the same time, Japan was increasing its

aggression in Asia.
3

5

Problems for the Dutch were twofold.

Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 53.

In the rice famine of 1918, the sugar barons refused to
switch acreage to rice cultivation, one cause of the
subsequent year's malnutrition which, combined with
influenza, killed 600,000.
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The Dutch needed more soldiers to protect the Dutch East
Indies, yet Dutch leaders assumed that arming the
nationalists would accelerate the loss of their Asian
empire. Colonial administrators were more afraid of the
Indonesian people than the armies of Japan.

With the

exception of Ambonese mercenaries, traditional soldiers of
the Dutch crown, the Indonesian people were not entrusted
with weapons to defend themselves.

6

Anti-colonial feelings grew stronger in the decade
prior to World War II as the Indonesians realized that Asian
countries could stand up to European colonial powers.

In

the words of Sultan Sjahrir, a future Indonesian prime
minister,
Essentially, the popularity of Japan
increased as one aspect of the growing anti-Dutch
animus and as a projection of a frustrated desire
for freedom .... The idea grew that the liberation
of Indonesia would begin with the expulsion of the
Dutch by the Japanese. 7
The Dutch Indies Government, a weakened rump regime
after the fall of the Netherlands to the German armies in
1940, did all it could to resist Japanese aggression.

When

the colonial government followed the United States in
6

Information Office of the Republic of Indonesia, Seven
Years of Indonesian Independence (New York, 1952), 5.
7

Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile
1949)' 18.

(New York:

John Day Co.,
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freezing Japanese assets and imposing an embargo on oil,
Japan decided to go to war.

A non-aggression pact with the

Soviet Union freed Japan to attack the United States and the
European Colonial powers in Asia on December 7-8, 1941.
After seizing Signapore from the British and conquering the
Malaysian peninsula, the Japanese occupied the Dutch East
Indies.

Japan's 1942 slogan, "The leader of Asia, the

protector of Asia, the light of Asia" was appealing, given
Indonesian resentment of Dutch rule.
Initially Indonesian nationalists treated the Japanese
as liberators, although, like their Dutch predecessors, the
Japanese occupied the archipelago in order to secure its
natural resources.

The Japanese permitted the display of

the Indonesian flag, the singing of the national anthem, and
opened up mid-level jobs by interning all Dutch nationals.
New mobility for Indonesian intellectuals brought support
for the Japanese.

Return of Dutch rule, after all, meant a

return to repressive conditions. 8
In fact, the Japanese exploited Indonesians every bit
as much as the Dutch.

Japanese aims were quite explicit:

" ... the prompt development and utilization of military
resources in the occupied areas and to look to strengthening

8

Sjahrir, Out of Exile, 237.
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and augmenting the Empire's war potential." 9 As Dr. Hatta
declared in November 1945:
For a full three and one-half years, the
Japanese worked their will on the population,
subjecting the people to a type of pressure and
oppression unknown in the last decades of Dutch
rule here.
The Japanese looked upon the
Indonesians as mere chattel ....
Forced labor was
imposed on the common people; the peasants were
intimidated into handing over to the Japanese the
products of their toil .... The entire population
was obligated to conform to Japanese military
.
. l'ine .... 10
d lSClP
As the war in the Pacific swung in favor of the United
States, Japanese commanders promoted the Indonesian
independence movement as a means of frustrating Allied
reoccupation.
The beginning of relatively tolerant Japanese policies
on the island of Java in 1943 confirmed the island's leading
role in national life after 1945.

Java was far more

developed than the other islands politically and
economically, and the Japanese encouraged the further
development of Indonesian culture and self-government.
9

Japanese Military Affairs Bureau, Ministry of the Navy,
"Statement by the Director upon the Inauguration of the
Souther Area Administration Office:
Draft," December 7,
1941, in Harry Benda, James K. Irikura, and Koichi Kishi,
Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected
Documents (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia
Studies, 1965), 13.
10

Information Office of the Republic of Indonesia, Seven
Years of Indonesian Independence, 6.

21
Bahasa Indonesia, not Dutch or Japanese, was spoken by
Indonesians.
films and art.
replaced.

Indonesian themes were employed in drama,
Symbols of Dutch imperial control were

The legacy of Japanese occupation evolved into

the opportunity it gave Indonesians to participate in
politics, administration and the military after 1943.
Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese organized Indonesians
into military units. In mid-1943, the Peta, or Defenders of
the Fatherland, numbered 37,000 on Java and 20,000 on
Sumatra.

Japan's acquiescence of greater Indonesian

autonomy convinced Sukarno and Hatta to cooperate.

Sukarno

and Hatta used all the means of modern communication the
Japanese placed at their disposal to spread nationalist
ideas and forced the Japanese to make concessions that would
potentially lead to self-government and independence. 11
As an Allied invasion of Japan appeared imminent, the
Japanese announced in September 1944 that the entire
Indonesian archipelago would become independent.

The

announcement vindicated the strategy of Sukarno and Hatta.
In March 1945, the Investigating Committee for

Preparatory

Work for Indonesian Independence was organized (BPUPKI).
The committee wanted the new nation's territory to include
11

J. D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (New
York:
Praeger, 1972), 178-180. Sukarno also provided
comfort women to Japanese troops during their occupation.
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not only the Netherlands Indies but Portuguese Timor,
British North Borneo, and the Malay Peninsula.

The basis

for postwar Indonesian foreign policy under Sukarno was thus
established.

The Jakarta Charter, an agreement based on

belief in one God, was a compromise in which key Muslim
leaders offered to give national independence precedence
over their desire to create an Islamic state.

The charter

cemented the allegiance of the intellectuals to the
revolution.

The committee chose Sukarno, who favored a

unitary state, and Hatta, who wanted a federal system, as
president and vice-president.

This was an association of

two very different leaders that would continue until 1956.
On June 1, 1945, Sukarno gave a speech outlining the
Pancasila, the five guiding principles of the new Indonesian
nation.

12

On August 15, 1945, the Japanese surrendered.

Moving quickly, the Indonesian leadership formally declared
independence only two days later:

"We, the people of

Indonesia, hereby declare Indonesia's independence.

Matters

concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be
executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible
time." 13

The proclamation was made a week before the agreed

12

The five principles are a belief in God,
humanitarianism, national unity, democracy and social
justice.
13

Benedict R. 0. G. Anderson, Java in a Time of
Revolution:
Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1972), 82. See too Kingship
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upon date with the Japanese to forestall accusations of
being a Japanese puppet regime. 14
The Indonesian declaration of independence
notwithstanding, the Dutch, in desperate need of Indonesian
natural resources to provide a sound basis for economic
recovery in post-war Europe, were determined to reoccupy the
country.

The Dutch financial stake in Indonesia was huge.

Investment alone totaled over $1.4 billion and the colony
had turned over $100 million in profits in 1940. 15
Holland's dependence on Indonesia was also psychological.
One Dutch official stated, "It is the Indies which make
Holland a world power. " 16

Accordingly the Dutch denounced

Sukarno and Hatta as collaborators with the enemy and the
new republic as a creation of Japanese fascism.

17
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14
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15
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As the allies closed in on victory, the Dutch were
eyeing the recapture of Indonesia.

Sukarno, Hatta and

Sjahrir envisioned a different future.

Early Japanese

success in World War II against the Dutch had shattered the
myth of Dutch superiority.
spread.

Nationalist ideas continued to

Paramilitary groups of Indonesian youth, the

Pemuda, organized and were indoctrinated with anti-Western
and anti-imperialists ideas.

These groups would form the

backbone of the Indonesian insurgency.
The Japanese had created conditions for revolution in
Indonesia which prevented a return to colonial status.

A

report written in 1945 by the United States Office of
Strategic Services bluntly stated, ''the Japanese occupation
of the Netherlands East Indies has made impossible the
return of the Indies to the status quo ante-bellum." 18
Violence was unavoidable if the Dutch were to try to
reimpose rule over their former colony.
The archipelago came under the immediate jurisdiction
of Admiral Earl Louis Mountbatten, the supreme Allied
commander for Southeast Asia.

As Indonesia's distance from

the main battle lines delayed the arrival of Allied troops

18

U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), "Effects of
the Japanese Occupation," Research and Analysis Report no.
3293, 1945, in U.S. Department of State Records, Record Group
59, National Archives, Washington D.C.
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on Java for months after the end of hostilities, Indonesian
nationalist forces had time to organize.
The governments of the United States and Britain had
few preconceived notions regarding Indonesia's future.

The

immediate goals in bringing troops to the islands were to
both disarm the Japanese and "maintain law and order until
the time that the lawful government of the Netherlands East
Indies was once again functioning. " 19

The second task

became a priority despite OSS reports and both tasks fell to
Admiral Mountbatten's British and Australian forces, which
did not land in Indonesia until September 1945.
Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull explained
American policy in Indonesia in his memoirs:
We summarized our thoughts on colonial areas
in Southeast Asia generally in a State Department
memorandum which I sent to the President on
September 8, 1944.
In this we suggested the value
of early, dramatic, and concerted announcements by
the nations concerned making definite commitments
as to the future of the regions of Southeast
Asia .... We added that it would be especially
helpful if such concerted announcements could
include (1) specific dates when independence or
complete self-government will be accorded, (2)
specific steps to be taken to develop native
capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of
economic autonomy and equality of economic
treatment toward other nations. 20

19
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Hull continued:
We could not help believing that the
indefinite continuance of the British, Dutch and
French possessions in the Orient in a state of
dependence provided a number of foci for future
trouble and perhaps war.
Permanent peace could
not be assured unless these possessions were
started on the road to independence, after the
example of the Philippines.
We believed that we
were taking the long-range view, and that lasting
peace in the Pacific was of greater ultimate
benefit to Britain, France, and the Netherlands,
as well as the whole world, than the possible
immediate benefits of holding onto colonies. 21
Earlier rhetoric from diplomatic officials and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt seemed to confirm an anticolonial position for the United States during World War II.
Roosevelt himself in a radio address to the nation on
February 23, 1942, declared that "The Atlantic Charter not
only applies to the parts of the world that border on the
Atlantic, but the whole world. "

22

These pronouncements and

the promise of early independence for the Philippines
profoundly influenced Indonesian nationalists leaders into
assuming their independence movement would also obtain
support from Washington.
While American anti-colonial rhetoric was occasionally
quite strong, enforcement ultimately was not.

Immediate

independence for Indonesia and other European colonies in
21

Ibid.

22
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Asia was a radical idea, while Roosevelt and Hull were
really gradualists.

Caught in the vise of inadequate

preparation for independence and full colonial restoration
of Dutch rule, American leaders sought other alternatives.
Finding none, they retreated to a reactionary position
regarding nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. 23
Even though there has always been a significant strain
of anti-colonialism in American thought, it should not be
overemphasized.

At the root of America's conservatism at

this time was the fact that it remained Eurocentric.

The

intransigence of European powers on the colonial issue and
the need to maintain harmony within the Western alliance
because of increasing Soviet aggression, coupled with
Roosevelt's gradualist attitude and the military's
insistence that national security interests demanded a
string of bases in the Pacific that could not be compromised
by recognizing Asian nationalism, ensured that the United
States acquiesced in the initial attempts of the Netherlands
to retake Indonesia. 24
23
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American anti-colonialism was never an overriding
principle of U.S. foreign policy.

The need to balance other

interests always tempered these inclinations. 25

Far more

important to U.S.-European relations was the order,
stability, and development that European colonial powers
brought to Southeast Asia. 26
Europe.

Higher priorities remained in

While the United States could broach the subject of

relinquishing colonies with her European allies, she was
still dependent upon them for the def eat of the Axis powers
during the war, and to oppose Soviet-led expansion after it.
Cordell Hull put the dilemma succinctly:
We could not press them too far with the
Southwest Pacific in view of the fact that we were
seeking the closest possible cooperation with them
in Europe.
We could not alienate them in the
Orient and expect to work with them in Europe." 27
The picture became blurred for Indonesian nationalists
because not even the State Department was unified in the

25
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colonial question. 28

The Office of European affairs was all

for giving the colonies back to America's European allies.
Long the most dominant group of diplomats in the State
Department, these diplomats, reinforced by the Navy and War
departments led by James Forrestal and Henry Stimson,
convinced the administration that European reacquisition of
Asian colonies would go off with minimal difficulty.
The Asianists within the State Department directly
opposed the Europeanists. For a combination of reasons-political, economic, and strategic-- these officials
believed that European imperialism could not long withstand
the force of Asian nationalism in the postwar world and that
the United States had best align itself with the wave of the
future.

"We must not commit ourselves to underwriting these

systems indefinitely," stated Far Eastern specialist Raymond
Kennedy. 29

China expert John Patton Davies concurred that

the United States could not be placed in opposition to the
rise of nationalism in Asia. 30

28
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The consequences of alienating the people of Asia, in
the view of these Far Eastern specialists, would be
disastrous:
There can be expected from the native peoples
increasing bitterness and antagonism.
The United
States, as the close associate and ally of the
colonial powers, will share with the latter that
enmity ... and the Soviet Union, whose policies and
ideologies have gained a real hold over many
progressive leaders in Asia and nearby areas,
would stand to increase its power and influence in
the area. 31
American foreign policy did bring about one large
influential result:

withdrawal of American forces from this

area of Southeast Asia.

Washington felt that it already had

a large enough area of responsibility in the Philippines,
China, and Japan.

Another possible reason for withdrawal

was that American diplomats wanted to wash their hands of
any direct involvement in restoring former colonial
governments and thus preserve the moral high ground of their
rhetoric.

In 1944, Hull predicted that the result of such

policies would be instability.

American policy vacillation

Report number 2666, October 28, 1944, Record Group 59,
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
31
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made Indonesian nationalists leaders mistrust American
leaders, mistrust that would take decades to erase and
prolong the unstable situation.
Closely watching events unfold, most Indonesians
concluded that the Allied goal was the restoration of Dutch
rule.

The fact that British troops, with a long history as

colonial occupiers, were sent to occupy Indonesia rather
than Americans, added fuel to the fire of Indonesian anticolonialism, itself a product of centuries of Dutch
colonialism and recent Japanese imperialism.

United States

government statements and traditions seemed to o{fer hope
for nascent nationalist movements, but concrete American
actions were not measuring up to the rhetoric. 32
After months of internal debate, the State Department
in late June 1945 worked out a broad policy toward
colonialism in Asia.
approach.

The result favored a Eurocentric

Cordell Hull, a strong Asian advocate, had been

replaced as Secretary of State by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,
and the Europeanists were in command.

Backed by H. Freeman

Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, and
Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, an anti-

32 For

further information on the British role in the
reoccupation of the Netherlands see Robert J. McMahon,
"Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Reoccupation of the
Netherlands East Indies,'' Diplomatic History, vol. 1, no. 1,
(Winter, 1978): 1-23.
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communist career diplomat, Stettinius would announce a
Europeanist position for American foreign policy. 33
Set forth in a position paper, the policy compromised
some of the differences between the Far Eastern and European
offices, but on the most important issues it leaned toward
the European point of view.

Its basic premise was that

American interests in Europe and the Far East could best be
promoted through cooperation with the colonial powers.

The

United States government should go no further than to
encourage the colonial powers to help native peoples achieve
a progressively larger measure of self-government and should
carefully avoid any action that might undermine western
influence in the colonial areas or impair the unity of the
major United Nations. 34
In the weeks before the Allied landings in Indonesia,
the leaders of the young republic hastily attempted to
consolidate their power.

The Committee for Preparation for

Independence transformed itself into the Central Indonesian
National Committee (KNIP).

This body was composed of 135

prominent nationalists chosen by Sukarno and Hatta from
among the leading religious, social and economic groups in

c. Herring, "The Truman Administration and the
Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina," Diplomatic
History, vol. 1, no. 2, (Spring, 1977) : 97-103.
33 George

34 Department

of State, "Policy Paper on Conditions in
Asia and the Pacific," June 22, 1945, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1945, VI, 558.

33
the East Indies.

It appointed eight governors to oversee

the eight provinces of the newly established republic.
Local populations overthrew local elites who had
collaborated with the Japanese and the Dutch.
youths in the Pemuda played a central role. 35

Activist
Sukarno

decreed that orders coming from defeated army forces be
ignored.

The Japanese, anxious to avert a clash, chose not

to challenge the Indonesian government.
Indonesians would have more time to form a new regime
than they initially thought.

While the United States

government avoided one problem by placing Indonesia
temporarily under British armed occupation, American policy
created a more serious issue.
prepared.

The British were woefully

Their task was the liberation of 1.5 million

square miles of Southeast Asia formerly under Japanese
control.

Since the reoccupation of British colonies

naturally received top priority, it was not until September
29 that the first British troops arrived.
found a functioning

n~tive

These troops

government actively supported by

the great majority of politically conscious Indonesians and
operating at a high degree of efficiency.

36

The British

appeared to accord de facto recognition on the infant
35 Kahin,
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34
government of Indonesia when Lieutenant General Sir Philip
Christison, commander of the Allied Forces in the
Netherlands East Indies, stated upon his arrival in
September, "We have no interest in their politics ... What
form of government the Dutch are going to give them I don't
know.

They'll certainly have to give them something." 37

This attempt to deal with the reality of the Indonesian
political situation was met with harsh criticism by the
Netherlands.

A spokesman for the Dutch position, Peter

Gerbrandy, wrote in his postwar history of Indonesia,
"British policy was the primary, if not the sole, cause of
collapse of the once stable kingdom of the Netherlands. " 38
Indonesia succeeded in the preliminary stage of
revolution and independence.

Its nationalists leaders had

successfully formulated a working system with popular
support. The second phase, consolidation and international
recognition, would take longer.

Intervention by outside

powers would prolong the struggle for independence.
Although the Dutch had been slow to respond following the
cessation of hostilities, they had no intention of giving up
their prize possession.
37 Admiral
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Chapter 2
Indonesia Attempts Independence

Although the British, who had little stake in
Indonesia, were willing to accept the realities there, the
Dutch were not.

They denounced Sukarno and Hatta as

Japanese Quislings.

The gradual, evolutionary approach to

colonial management they espoused earlier was now out of the
question.

American officials were as disappointed in the

Dutch as were the British. 1

A report by the State

Department's Research and Intelligence Branch expressed,
"unless some decisive and constructive steps to break the
deadlock are taken in the near future, the situation may
degenerate into more widespread violence .... " 2

Frederick

Crockett, a United States military observer, made the
following observation concerning the Dutch:
... there began to appear in the streets of
Djakarta roving patrols of trigger happy Dutch and
1 For

more information, see Robert J. McMahon, "AngloAmerican Diplomacy and the Reoccupation of the Netherlands
East Indies," Diplomatic History, vol. 1, no. 1, (Winter,
1978): 1-23.

u.s. Department of State, "The Political Issues and
Occupational Problems in the N.E.I.," Report number 3279,
October 19, 1945, Record Group 59, National Archives,
Washington D.C.
35
2

36
Ambonese soldiers. They shot at anything that
looked suspicious, and ... they were not above
forcing an Indonesian house and dragging off,
without char~es or warrants, some or all of the
inhabitants.
On October 28, 1945, major violence erupted in Surabaya,
East Java.

Occupying British troops clashed with Pemuda and

other armed groups.

The Battle of Surabaya, a contest where

over a division of British troops were held off by
Indonesian forces for ten days, was the bloodiest single
engagement in the war for independence and forced the Allies
to deal with the Indonesian Republic.
The British now found themselves in the very same
predicament that the United States had sidestepped.

They

had to decide whether to withdraw or reimpose Dutch
sovereignty by force.
help.

The Americans offered little actual

Officials of the State Department tried to walk a

fine line to maintain good relations with both sides.

In a

telegram to Truman, Sukarno asked for the United States to
act as a mediator. 4

Washington listened to the Dutch, who

insisted successfully that the conflict was an internal
affair.

3

American anti-imperialist attitudes were not strong

Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 142.

4 Sukarno

message directly to Truman, October 26, 1945,
856E.00/10-2645, Record Group 59, National Archives,
Washington D.C.
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enough to cause the United States to intervene in the
internal affairs of friendly powers. 5
Unofficially, the State Department was unhappy with the
Dutch desire to resume control.

Officials of the Research

and Intelligence Branch concluded, "the situation may
degenerate into more widespread violence ... necessitating
armed action by British and Dutch troops against resisting
Indonesians." 6 But the State Department was far from
advocating intervention.

"It would seem important to avoid

any entanglement in the colonial problem? of western powers
in Southeast Asia unless essential to protect American
security interests from some threat not presently visible,"
wrote Abbot Moffat, chief of the State Department's Division
of Southeast Asian Affairs. 7
America's snub of Indonesian nationalists cost much
goodwill.

These Indonesians thought the United States was

5
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not living up to the anti-colonial position enunciated
during the war.

Indonesian disappointments were all the

keener because the nationalists had adopted a diplomatic
strategy that counted heavily upon United States
intervention in the dispute.

Ruslan Abdulgani, a leading

Indonesian intellectual, stated the Indonesian position
quite well:

"It may be that to Western politicians the Four

Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter were weapons of
psychological warfare, to us they were an immutable
blueprint for the future." 8
Though Washington pledged strict neutrality,
Indonesians considered the American stance pro-Dutch.

The

American government trained Dutch troops and gave them lendlease equipment and economic aid in the tens of millions. 9
Sukarno was quoted from a radiogram in the New York Times
stating, " ... the Dutch continue to wear U.S. army uniforms
and canteens marked U.S.A.

1110
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The Nationalists, however, remained moderate in nature.
Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir believed that diplomasi
(diplomacy) was the best strategy because of the weaknesses
of the new republican government.

On November 5, 1945, a

political manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia was
published promising a welcome to foreign investment and
protection for foreign properties. 11

Dr. A. K. Gani, the

republic's minister for economic affairs, reassured all
interested parties that his government wanted to attract
foreign capital and would deal fairly with all investors. 12
On November 9, through the efforts of Sukarno and
Sjahrir, the new republic was given a parliamentary form of
government.

Sjahrir, who had refused to cooperate with the

Japanese regime and campaigned hard against the continued
existence of wartime regimes and organizations like Peta,
was appointed the first prime minister.

He symbolized

moderation in that he was Western educated, and an adept
negotiator.

Moderates seemed firmly in control.

While the

11
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move pleased the United States, it was still unacceptable to
the Dutch. 13
Dutch intransigence, coupled with British and U.S.
"neutrality," produced an unstable political situation.

In

the face of British and American diplomatic pressure, the
Dutch offered to accept reforms that offered cosmetic
changes.

Their purpose was to buy time for the Dutch army,

which was preparing to enforce Dutch rule by force.
that time, the British prepared to withdraw.

At just

They kept

contact with the moderates in control of the revolution,
limited their present commitment so as to suffer no more
casualties, and gave a foothold for the Dutch while allowing
the Indonesian government to consolidate its foothold on
Java and the outer islands.

The British hoped for a

negotiated settlement. 14
American policy makers issued a proclamation on
December 19, 1945, that revealed similar alarm over the
turmoil in Indonesia:
The United States.Government has viewed with
increasing concern recent developments in the
Netherlands East Indies. It had hoped the
13
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conversations between the Indonesians and the
Netherlands authorities would have resulted in a
peaceful settlement recognizing alike the natural
aspirations of the Indonesian peoples and the
legitimate rights and interests of the
Netherlands .... a settlement can be attained only
through a realistic broad minded and conservative
approach on the part of all concerned and a will
to reconcile differences by peaceful means. 15
This message encouraged the resumption of talks, and pulled
the United States into the controversy.
American involvement was a tightrope act that
threatened to alienate both sides, but ultimately it served
to undermine Indonesian moderate rule.

American recognition

of the rights of the Netherlands as the "territorial
sovereign" amounted to the denial of the moderates' quest
for status as equals.

Dutch intransigence (made easier by

United States economic aid) fueled Perdjuangan, an alternate
strategy of Indonesian revolutionaries who based their hopes
on the strength of the national revolutionary movement.
chief advocate was the Communist leader Tan Malaka.

Its

He did

not believe independence would be a gift bestowed by the
Dutch.

He felt armed struggle was inevitable. 16

Dutch actions increased the appeal of Tan Malaka's
revolutionary strategy.

Early in 1946 Captain Westerling of

the Dutch occupation forces systematically executed
15
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16
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guerrillas and civilians.

Indonesians estimated 30,000

killed and the Dutch confirmed 4,000 dead.

17

The killing

fueled an internal debate over the course of strategy. The
inability of moderates to gain quick independence from the
Dutch encouraged more radical elements to gain power in
order to try their luck.

Competing political forces

promoted turmoil.
American historian, John R. W. Smail argued that two
separate revolutions were taking place simultaneously:

one

to establish home rule and one to establish who would rule
at home.

The difficulty of the moderate position of the

diplomasi strategy "was that the

Republic could not be

maintained successfully against the Allies without the
dynamism of the Perdjuangan, itself necessarily subversive
of the domestic status quo. " 18
Sutan Sjahrir, emphasizing the moderate attitude of the
Indonesian leadership at the time and swallowing private
doubts, sent an appreciative Christmas telegram to President
Truman in December 1945 praising the efforts of the United
States in the controversy.

17
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control, but the reservoir of goodwill in U.S.-Indonesian
relations was evaporating.
The new year seemed to bring renewed efforts by the
Dutch to reach an agreement.

J. H. A. Logemann, the Dutch

minister for overseas territories, declared the colonial
relationship outdated. 19

By February, faced with imminent

British withdrawal, the Dutch agreed to meet for formal
talks with Indonesian representatives.

Van Mook, former

Lieutenant Governor of the Indonesian colony and now the
Dutch representative at these talks, and Sjahrir, prime
minister of Indonesia, led the respective delegations.

Van

Mook proposed a preparatory period after which the
Indonesian people could freely decide their political
destiny.
period.

He gave no specific end date to the preparatory
Indonesia was to be something between a colony and

a dominion. 20
Sjahrir responded that he would accept nothing less
than commonwealth status similar to Australia's in the
British empire.

Acceptance of the Dutch offer would lead to

the fall of his parliamentary government.

He knew that the

19
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rule of the moderates was tenuous and he had to press for
full independence. 21
The strength of Perdjuangan had grown steadily during
the winter of 1946 as diplomasi did not produce results.
Coalescing around Tan Malaka and demanding complete
independence as the minimal goal, the Persatuan Perdjuangan
(Fighting Front, or PP) engendered support from almost all
political parties and the major senior officers of the army.
By forcing the resignation of Sjahrir, the PP appeared to
end the rule of the moderates.

Sukarno, as president,

allowed Tan Malaka to form a new cabinet.

Severe internal

divisions prevented this and by mid-March 1946 Sjahrir
returned as prime minister.

The moderates survived the

first attempt to end their rule. 22
Sjahrir, temporarily strengthened, resumed negotiations
with Van Mook.

He demanded recognition of the Republic's

sovereignty over the whole archipelago, rejected the
transitional period, and asked for complete withdrawal of
Dutch troops.

He also asked for a body composed of both

Dutch and Indonesians for the conduct of foreign affairs and
defense of both countries. 23
21

Van Mook countered with a

Foote to Byrnes, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 8 (14 February 1946): 810.
22

Anderson, Java, 310-6.

23

Ibid, 316-22.
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proposal based on recent French-Vietnamese negotiations.
Indonesia could be a partner in a federated republic. 24
Sjahrir's response was conciliatory. Instead of
outright recognition of sovereignty, he now demanded only de
facto recognition of the republic's authority over Java and
Sumatra. 25

While the Dutch abided by Indonesian demands of

control over Java, they refused to acknowledge Indonesian
authority over Sumatra, and the new cabinet of Sjahrir's
could not survive further compromise.

Aggravating the

situation was the Dutch insistence on a protocol instead of
a treaty, the acceptance of which would relegate the
republic to an inferior position as a possession. 26
As talks stalled, opposition to Sjahrir and moderate
rule increased.

The problems all moderates face in leading

a revolution became apparent.
actually a source of weakness.

Control of the government was
The Indonesian moderates

became personifications of the status quo which needed
changing.

Ruling in the name of freedom and independence,

the moderates found it difficult to suppress the more
extremist factions.

Since they were busy governing, it was

hard for them to retain control of the differing political
24
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25 Idrus
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26
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factions.

Extremist groups found they could continue their

attempts to seize power even after their initial attempts
failed.

27

These factions, convinced in the spring 1946 of
imminent Dutch military action, demanded Sjahrir's ouster
and insisted the republic abandon diplomasi for armed
struggle.

The paradoxical position in which Sjahrir found

himself mirrored the typical problems of moderates in a
revolution.

A major element of Sjahrir's political

strength, his acceptability to the Dutch, prevented him from
building a solid base of support within Indonesia that would
calm Dutch suspicions. 28
On June 27, 1946, extreme nationalists again challenged
moderate rule.

They kidnapped Sjahrir.

Sukarno staved them

off by declaring emergency powers and making a stirring
speech on Indonesian radio.

Appealing for stability and

opposition based on democratic principles, Sukarno exclaimed
that the kidnapping would give the Dutch the excuse that
Indonesia could not rule herself.

The appeal worked.

Sjahrir was released and quickly consolidated his position,
forming a third government by October 2.
27
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The internal bickering of Indonesian factions gave the
Dutch time to build up their military forces in Indonesia.
By October 1946 there were 47,000 Dutch troops in the
archipelago.

30

Dutch forces would kill some 40,000 pro-

republican Indonesians in the next year, and seize control
of all the islands in the archipelago except Java and
Sumatra. 31
At this time, United States military support for the
Dutch angered Indonesians.

The Indonesian newspaper Merdeka

urged Americans to protest the use of American marine
uniforms by Dutch troops.

Indonesians knew that the United

States provided the military equipment used against them. 32
The United States and Great Britain had the power to force
the Netherlands to negotiate, yet were unwilling to use it.
The new Dutch government realized that it was not yet ready
to attempt to pacify the East Indies and following the Koets
mission, an exploratory mission by the Dutch to test the
validity of Indonesian claims of a working government in the

30
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31
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Javanese interior, 33 reopened negotiations on October 7.

On

October 14, a truce was signed stabilizing existing military
positions.
This truce, called the The Linggadjati Agreement,
represented a series of compromises.

The Hague agreed to

recognize de facto authority of the Indonesian republic over
both Java and Sumatra.

The republicans assented to a

federal form of government.

Linggadjati created the United

States of Indonesia as a sovereign and equal partner in a
Netherlands union.

34

Within days the British withdrew their final contingent
of troops, and troubles began.

The problem lay in the

considerable ambiguity of the settlement.

As stated by the

Office of Far Eastern Research within the State Department,
"The signing of the Linggadjati Agreement does no more than
ease tensions ... In essence both sides ... cling to their
original viewpoint." 35

The British were leaving, and the

Indonesians would clamor for increasing United States
33

"The general picture we saw was that of a society which
was not in the course of dissolution but which is being
consolidated." Quoted from, Wolf, Indonesian Story, 42.
34
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involvement if the agreement broke down.

Moderates were

still in control in Indonesia, but their rule was tenuous.
Dutch action would test this control.
Throughout 1946, official American policy continued to
take a neutral stance over the Indonesian-Dutch conflict so
as not to alienate either side.

The effect of this policy

worked to the distinct advantage of the Dutch. By January
1947, the United States had extended lend-lease and property
credits in excess of 100 million to the Netherlands. 36
Further, American officials refused to recognize the
Republic of Indonesia as an equal party in the dispute.
While Washington clearly did not want the Dutch to reassert
control by force of arms, American "neutrality" did not
foresee intervening to contest the Dutch attempt to once
again impose their rule.

Sukarno's anger was such that at a

Malaya nationalist reception following Linggadjati, Dutch
and American flags were not displayed. 37
The deliberately ambiguous foreign policy of the United
States government was not achieving its goals.

Further,

American maneuvering at the United Nations did nothing to
endear American policy to Indonesians.

American
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representatives refused to support not only the Indian and
Ukranian proposals friendly to Indonesian independence, but
even refused to back the moderate Australian proposal.

This

seemed to confirm that the United States was siding with the
colonial powers and the USSR was not. 38

The Republic

followed the Security Council deliberations closely.
American positioning sought stability and a moderate
nationalist regime.

The problem was that it also sought to

have the colonial powers maintain economic, military and
political influence in their former possessions. 39
desires were mutually exclusive.

The two

While the Asianists within

the State Department understood this aspect of American
policy, the Europeanists did not. 40

Lack of agreement in

the American camp caused deep Indonesian resentment and made
it difficult for the moderates in Indonesia to maintain
control.

The ''Europe first" strategy of the United States

would contain Soviet expansion on that continent, but
exacerbated tensions in Southeast Asia.
38

The USSR assumed ·the U.S. worked through colonial
powers when independent movements were too strong.
39
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Deteriorating conditions in that part of the world led
to increased American involvement on the Dutch side in the
East Indies, particularly when British forces pulled out.
American interventionist activity arose from the penchant of
American statesmen to fill power vacuums, and by the
Republic of Indonesia's strategic location and plentiful
national resources.

Reflecting this increased activity was

a cable sent in the spring of 1947 from Secretary of State
George Marshall to Herman Baruch, the new ambassador to The
Hague, concerning Indonesian and other nationalist movements
in Southeast Asia.

Marshall expressed apprehension about

the movements leaning toward totalitarian or Pan-Asiatic
philosophies, "as either trend would be contrary to the
interests of Western democracies. " 41
Even though the United States was a new player in
Indonesia, the American "neutral" position remained proDutch.

Compounding matters, the very vagueness of

Linggadjati led each side to take markedly different views
of the agreement's meaning.

The situation ensured increased

United States involvement that would perpetuate instability.
Two problems stood out.

The first was the need for

cooperation when neither side trusted the other.

The second

was the federal structure of the proposed United States of
41

Marshall to Baruch, May 16, 1947, in Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1947, 6: 924.
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Indonesia.

The republic, which represented 85 percent of

the Indonesian population and the equivalent percentage of
exports, had no more status than the other lesser states:
Borneo and East Indonesia.

This downplayed the republic's

importance in the new government and ensured continued Dutch
control.
The agreement was doomed to failure.
sides hardened.

Attitudes on both

Indonesian moderates realized they must to

stand firm to remain in power in the republic.

Van Mook and

the Dutch government realized the need to control Indonesian
raw materials, which were essential in maintaining a
positive balance of payments and rebuilding

the economy of

the Netherlands devastated by World War II.
Republican suspicions were aroused when they learned in
the spring of 1947 that the Dutch were trying to instigate a
rebellion on West Java.

42

The Dutch responded that

Indonesia was practicing an independent foreign policy, a
violation of the agreement.

Some form of overt Indonesian

resistance to Dutch rule became increasingly likely.
Violence in Indonesia would threaten economic recovery
in the Netherlands, and American policy makers began to
42

United States Department of State, Office of
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change their approach towards the Dutch.

American support

for Dutch rule became limited to a moderate or liberal kind
of Dutch hold on the archipelago, one that ensured the Dutch
of needed materials while acquiescing to growing national
desires for autonomy.
The United States pressured the Netherlands by
threatening to hold up Export-Import bank loans and the
Dutch came back to the negotiating table in May 1947.
President Truman was keenly aware that Western European
problems with nationalists movements in their colonies
deprived them of key _natural resources.

A report prepared

by the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency emphasized
this fact,
Of important concern in relation to Western
European recovery is the existing instability in
colonial areas upon the resources of which several
European powers have hitherto been accustomed to
depend ... The continuance of unsettled conditions
hinders economic recovery and causes diversion of
European strength into efforts to maintain or
reimpose control by force. 1143
Indonesia's upheaval directly affected the rehabilitation
and reintegration of Western Europe, and the expansion of
production and trade there.
43

It was also an important factor

Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World
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in Western competition with the Soviet Union for the
friendship and resources of the developing world. 44
The Dutch and Indonesians came to an impasse after
negotiations.

While the new plan attempted to solve the

issue of sovereignty by calling for Dutch rule until January
1, 1949, it severely restricted republican authority until
that date.

To make matters worse for the moderates, the

plan came in the form of an ultimatum.

Republican leaders

were given only two weeks to accept the plan. 45
The State Department believed that the May 27 proposal
was made in earnest and encouraged the Republic to respond
"promptly in a spirit of good faith and compromise.
Indonesian response was not so positive.

1146

The

The Dutch demands

were denounced by most Indonesian political and military
leaders.

While Sjahrir knew the Dutch were preparing to use

force, he also knew that acceptance of this proposal was
44
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suicide for the moderates.

While Sjahrir accepted the

proposal in principle, he attached qualifications that the
Dutch found unacceptable.

Sjahrir brought forward proposals

again on June 20, accepting the Dutch concept of the interim
government.

The Dutch again refused.

When the degree of

Sjahrir's concessions became known, most leaders withdrew
support and he resigned on June 27. 47
Washington continued to urge Indonesia to assent to the
Dutch proposal.

Abbot Moffat, head of the State

Department's Southeast Asian Division, summarized American
objectives in Indonesia on July 8, 1947.
The objective of the United States is to
secure a settlement of the present Indonesian
situation which will meet the natural aspirations
of Indonesian nationalism and, at the same time,
preserve so far as possible for the Netherlands
the economic strength which she derives from
association with the Indies. 48
This approach led republican leaders to conclude the United
States was backing the Dutch against the Republic.
47
48

Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 207-8.

Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1981), 164-5. For more on U.S.
thinking at the time consult Grayson Kirk, "American Security
Policy in the Pacific," in J.C. Vincent et al., America's
Future in the Pacific (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press), 166.
"The U.S. thus faces a possible dilemma of
supporting the maintenance, perhaps by repressive means, of a
situation which is foreign to American tradition and
political attitudes or of supporting or at least permitting a
deterioration in the power position of those states whose
collaboration is potentially of great importance."
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While most Indonesians did not like the United States
position and had ousted Sjahrir for making too many
concessions, moderates were still in control.

The new prime

minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, made even more concessions and
still the Dutch did not agree.

The Dutch wanted a joint

police force, and the republic felt it could compromise no
further.

War was inevitable, a war that Moffat warned would

"probably strengthen Soviet influence in the area." 49

49

0.S. Department of State, Memorandum by Moffat, July 8,
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Chapter 3
The Rocky Road to Independence

On July 21, 1947, the Dutch, claiming violations of the
Linggadjati Agreement, launched a "police action" against
the Indonesian republic.

Dutch troops drove the republicans

out of Sumatra and confined them to central Java.

Only its

inability to destroy the main body of the guerrilla-trained
Indonesian troops marred the Dutch army's action.
Aware that international reaction to the Dutch military
offensive was negative, President Sukarno appointed Sjahrir
ambassador at large to take the Indonesian case to the
United Nations Security Council.

Simultaneously, Prime

Minister Sjarifuddin broadcast from the republican capital
of Jogjakarta asking for a halt to hostilities and help from
the international community. 1

On July 25, Sukarno broadcast

an urgent appeal for American intervention:

"Just as your

American ancestors fought 170 years ago for your liberty and
independence, so are we Indonesians fighting for ours.

1

New York Times, July 23, 1947, sec. 1, p. 2.
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Just
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as you then rebelled against dominion by a country far
across the seas, so are we." 2
Americans avoided any criticism of the Dutch attack.
The American position, of course, further undermined
moderate rule.

When the issue was brought before the United

Nations, the United States assisted the Dutch in presenting
their viewpoint.

The United States ambassador to the

Netherlands, Herman Baruch, accepted uncritically the Dutch
position, refusing to withhold the Marshall Plan economic
assistance that most certainly could have been applied as
the stick to force Dutch acceptance of the spirit of
Liggadjati. 3
At the United Nations, many representatives suggested
that Great Britain and the United States should try to stop
the conflict.

The United States was concerned that the

affair would cause the Security Council to divide along a
Russia-Asiatic bloc against the Anglo-American alliance.
America did not want to incur the wrath of the newly
emerging areas of the world.

4

On August 6, the United

States offered to mediate the dispute between the Dutch and
2
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the Indonesians.

While the republic accepted the offer, it

also asked the United States that an international
arbitration commission be dispatched to Indonesia at once.
A significant shift was occurring in Indonesian
republican attitudes.

They now believed that the forum of

the United Nations would better serve their interests.

On

August 14, over Dutch objections, Sjahrir, speaking before
the Security Council, delivered a ringing indictment of
Dutch actions. 5

The Council promptly called for another

cease-fire on August 26, and established a Good Offices
Committee (GOC) to sponsor further negotiations.
composed of members from three nations:

It was

Belgium, an ally of

the Netherlands; Australia, Indonesia's advocate in the
Security Council's deliberations to date; and the United
States. 6

Dr. Frank P. Graham of the United States was

elected chairman of the committee.

The Australian

representative was Mr. Richard C. Kirby, judge of the
Australian Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration.

M. Paul van Zeeland, a well known economist

and former premier, represented Belgium.
As a superpower, it was clear that the United States
would be responsible for shaping all proposals, .and it
5
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subtly, but consistently, favored the Dutch position.

The

Good Offices Committee only advised, which accommodated the
Dutch.

They believed that time was on their side as the

truncated Indonesian republic continued to deteriorate.
Indonesia was well aware of the continued pro-Dutch position
of the United States.

Mr. Kasimo, Vice Minister of Economic

Affairs stated on November 12, 1947, that "obvious
partiality of the United States was being given in favor of
the Dutch." 7
While the United States worked to bring the two sides
together, the Soviet Union's chief delegate to the United
Nations, Mr. Gromyko, was making a speech to the Security
Council in October 1947.
The people of Indonesia are fighting for
their freedom .... They find themselves confronted
in this struggle by powers, who for centuries have
been in authority in these areas.
It is the task
of the United Nations ... to defend the legitimate
interests of such peoples .... 8
The dispute was now taking on cold war dimensions.
The American cruiser the U.S.S. Renville, anchored off
the coast of Java, served as a neutral place to forge a new
agreement.

Members of the Indonesian nationalist movement

and members of the Dutch delegation, along with the United
7
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States representative to the GOC, Frank Graham, were aboard
ship to work on a new accord.

Initially both sides stuck to

their own interpretations of the Linggadjati agreement until
the GOC delivered its "Christmas Message" on December 25.
The message was crafted for both sides and called for
"greater realism" and "reciprocal toleration."

It asked the

Indonesian delegation to accept the Netherlands position on
the military issues in return for a fair and peaceful
determination of political issues that included the
subsequent withdrawal of Dutch forces from all territory
taken by the most recent offensive. 9
the message favored the Dutch.

Frank Graham knew that

The preponderance of Dutch

military forces in Indonesia made a pro-Dutch proposal
inevitable. 10

On December 30, the republicans reluctantly

accepted the GOC proposal in a memorandum sent to the
committee.

"Although they are not strictly in accordance

with the republican's own understanding of the Security
Council's resolutions, the Indonesian delegation accepts
9
10

McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 199.

The republic had to accept the Netherlands position on
military issues in order to determine the political ones.
The truce line was set at Dutch forward positions at the end
of the police action, which Indonesian representatives
disputed.
The proposal called for the restoration of
republican civil administration within three months of the
signing of the agreement and Dutch withdrawal from areas
taken during the police action. Each side would then begin
troop reductions and free economic activity would be
restored.
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them as an integrated and balanced whole for the
settlement." 11 Graham had advised the republican delegation
that if they did not agree to the truce proposals and the
twelve Dutch additions, the function of the Committee would
end.

The dispute would return to the Security Council where

the French would veto any attempt at binding arbitration.
Graham further advised that the United States would not
protest further use of Dutch military force, but would hold
the Dutch to the agreement.

The republicans, although

averse to many aspects of the proposal, agreed. 12

They were

low on arms and ammunition and the agreement offered some
movement toward independence.
The Dutch sacrificed little.

They attached a dozen new

proposals to the GOC's proposal based on the Christmas
telegram and accepted only those offered by Indonesia that
favored them.

The republic accepted all additional Dutch

demands and the Netherlands still stalled.

By January 1948

American pressure on the Dutch began to mount.

American

diplomats urged the Netherlands to accept the GOC proposal

11
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and Cold War, 201.
12
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or risk the exclusion of the Netherlands from the European
Recovery Program. 13
American pressure on the Dutch to accept the proposal
had roots in its cold war perspective.

First, Dutch

sovereignty would continue over Indonesia in the near
future, ensuring that the Netherlands would fill this
potential vacuum while the Marshall Plan stabilized Europe.
More important was the desire of the State Department to
accelerate trade between Indonesia and the rest of the
world.

Indonesia could be a supplier of natural resources

to the countries of Europe now depending on the United
States European Recovery Program.

Yet no matter how much

the Dutch wanted to retain control of Indonesia, war
prevented the end reason for control:

European access to

Indonesian natural resources.
The Dutch bowed to American pressure and on January 17,
1948, the Dutch and republicans signed the agreement on
board the U.S.S. Renville. Many basic issues still remained
to be resolved.

American pressure had brought the Dutch to

sign the agreement, ensuring Dutch cooperation to keep the
moderate nationalists in power in Indonesia was another
matter.
13
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The Renville Agreement represented a humiliating defeat
for the Republic of Indonesia.

Prime Minister Sjarifuddin

agreed to the settlement in the face of strong opposition.
Two major political parties withdrew from his cabinet and
the government fell when he resigned on January 23, 1948. 14
Once again, the pro-Dutch policies of the United States had
a hand in shaking moderate rule, providing the opportunity
for extremist forces to challenge the republicans.
Yet moderates still had a grip on the power structure
of the Republic.

Mohammed Hatta, a firm moderate, announced

the formation of a new government and quickly revealed that
he was firmly committed to the implementation of the
Renville Agreement.

Once again the moderate strategy of

diplomasi was able to resist the strategy
perdj uangan.

ot

the extremists,

15

The Renville agreement conformed perfectly to American
objectives.

Its compromise formula attempted to harmonize

Dutch control over the Indies with a timetable for eventual
native self-rule.

The Agreement ensured the balance between

14
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European and Indonesian nationalist interests.

Like the

Linggadjati Agreement previously, it rested on good faith
and was also subject to differing interpretations. 16
In accordance with the truce agreement, Hatta began the
immediate withdrawal of guerrilla troops from their
strategic emplacements behind Dutch lines. 17

This was a

major concession, showing the confidence and endurance of
the moderates, but the Dutch would take advantage.
The Netherlands delayed political discussions until
March and in the meantime pursued their federal policy in
open disregard of the Renville Agreement.

Frank Graham, who

asked President Truman to replace him following the
agreement so he could resume his duties as president of the
University of North Carolina, was succeeded on the GOC by
Coert duBois, a recently retired Foreign Service veteran
with extensive experience in East Asia as former consul
general in the East Indies in the 1930s.

The Belgian and

Australian representatives also departed and were supplanted
by their deputies-Raymond Herremans, a minister in the
Belgian diplomatic service, and Thomas K. Critchley, an
officer in the Australian Department of External Affairs and
16
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17
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an accomplished economist. 18

While the diplomats on the GOC

changed, the divisive issues remained the same, chief among
them sovereignty and control of foreign policy.

On these

issues duBois sided with the Dutch, stating that sovereignty
and foreign policy resided with the Netherlands. 19
Stimulated by perceived American support, the Dutch
proceeded with expansion of their federal program.

The

Dutch invited all thirteen non-republican Indonesian states
to a conference on May 27, 1948.
protests with the GOC. 20

Republican leaders lodged

The Bandung Conference of 1948

initiated by the Dutch, Graham complained, violated "the
intent and spirit of the Renville Agreement." 21

DuBois

agreed and warned if the Netherlands continued to carry out
its federal program without the participation of the
republicans, the resultant government "will be an unnatural
organization which only Dutch arms ... can maintain." 22

The
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State Department's Office of Intelligence Research went
further, warning that the resultant breakdown in
negotiations would lead to hostilities and jeopardize both
moderate rule in Indonesia and the economic recovery of the
Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. 23
By May, duBois seemed to side with the nationalists,
stating that U.S. political prestige would soar in Indonesia
on the strength of a settlement that favored them. 24

He

looked to have the United States become more involved and
drafted a compromise proposal with the Australians.

The

resulting duBois-Critchley proposals sought to deal with the
problem of sovereignty during the interim period before
Indonesian independence. 25

The proposals kept moderates in

power to deny growing communist influence within Indonesia.
23

U.S. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research for
the Far East, "Implications for the U.S. of Threatened
Breakdown in Indonesian Negotiations," Situation ReportSouthern Areas, no. 3480.54, June 2, 1948, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
24

"Indonesian Peace Brings Trade Rebirth," Business Week,
(May 8 , 19 4 8 ) , 117-120 .·
25

Elections would be held throughout Indonesia for
delegates to a constituent assembly which would serve as both
a provisional legislature and a constitutional convention.
Acting as a provisional parliament that would act as an
interim government, the assembly would delineate the states
to be included in the United States of Indonesia. It would
attain control over all internal and external affairs.
Sovereignty and ultimate authority would reside with the
Netherlands. It would then draft a constitution recognizing
legitimate Dutch interests. Once ratified, the Netherlands
would then transfer sovereignty. McMahon, Colonialism and
Cold War, 220.
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The moderates continued authority also discouraged Soviet
interest in the Republic.
Republicans immediately accepted the proposals as a
basis of further discussion.

The Dutch reacted with disdain

and broke off talks on June 16.

The fear of the Dutch was

that free elections would confirm what they already knew:
the republic represented the vast aspirations of the
Indonesian majority.

By breaking off the talks the Dutch

sought somehow to preserve their preponderance of power.
Again American policy put moderates in Indonesia at
risk and promoted instability by refusing to pressure the
Dutch to any significant extent.

The duBois-Critchley

proposals were sacrificed to the perceived larger interests
of American foreign policy.

The issues of the summer of

1948 called for solidarity among Washington's European
allies.

The success of the Marshall Plan and the

establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were
paramount.

Friction was to be avoided.

Since colonial

possessions seemed necessary for the rapid recovery of
Western Europe, it was natural to keep the pro-Dutch
"neutral" position.

In fact, the American government was

allocating $506 million in European Recovery Program aid to
the Netherlands. 26

According to Senate Hearings held in

u. s. Department of State, OIR, Division of Research
for the Far East, "Political Implications of E.C.A. Aid to
26

69
1965, American assistance to the Dutch in Indonesia from
1945 to 1950 was $70 million dollars for Marshall Plan aid
and $60 million in grants.

The Dutch also received $75

million dollars in surplus arms and another $100 million in
arms made available if the Netherlands so desired.
Secretary of State George Marshall admitted in 1947 that the
United States had equipped a Dutch Marine Brigade fighting
against the Indonesian Republic, and that the United States
had provided the Dutch with 54 bombers, 64 fighters, 266
mortars, 170 pieces of artillery-and 159 machine guns. 27
American military weaponry greatly strengthened the
Netherlands in its struggle against the Indonesians.

The

practical effect of European Cooperation Agreement, noted a
State Department report, ''is to strengthen the economic,
political, and military position of the Netherlands in
Indonesia ....

Reactions to ERP grants by the Dutch and by

the Indonesians show that this effect is clearly understood
by both sides." 28
Indonesia,'' Situation Report-Southern Areas, no. 3480.56,
October 29, 1948, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
27

U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on
Foreign Assistance, 1965, p. 574. Senator Brewster in
Congressional Record, 81st congress, 1st session, Volume 95,
part 3, p. 3386. The New York Times, January 5 and 15, 1946.
28
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While the Dutch took the American approach as a
realization of their policy goals, the moderates in
Indonesia lost much of their goodwill toward the United
States.

ERP grants were roundly denounced.

John Coast,

advisor to the Indonesian foreign ministry, made a public
statement that the Indonesians were turning to the Soviet
Union as a last hope in helping them achieve independence.
Indonesians saw no difference between fighters for
independence in Palestine or the Philippines, and
themselves. 29

As native resentment of the United States

increased, extremist enemies of the moderates were able to
use American support of the Dutch as ammunition in their
attempt to gain power.
While the United States was maintaining a "Europef irst" policy, Asian specialists like William S. B. Lacy in
the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs and Major General A.
R. Bolling, acting director of intelligence for the army,
complained that the American position would compromise its
interests in the developing world.

In a letter to the Chief

of Staff Bolling warned, "The U.S. will be accused of
turning its back on independence movements ... and the
Indonesian republic and other sincere independence movements

29 New

York Times, September 8, 1948, sec. 1, p. 14.
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will be forced to turn to Russia in desperation.

1130

Some

said the United States lost its reputation as a "champion of
colonial liberation." 31

This tendency was sure to be

exploited by Communist propaganda as part of American
imperialism. 32

American foreign policy priorities in Asia

now came under closer scrutiny and gained more sway within
the American national security establishment.
In the wake of the Czech coup orchestrated by the
Soviet Union to cement a sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe, July 1948 brought a deepening realization by
American diplomats of the need to spearhead further
negotiations and bring the Dutch back to the bargaining
table.

As the two sides hardened their stance, H. Merle

Cochran replaced an ill duBois, at the GOC. Another proDutch sympathizer for the Netherlands, the Indonesians felt
that the American stance of pro-Dutch neutrality remain
unchanged.
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The state of the moderates became tenuous by July 1948.
With republican leaders and Dutch officials arguing for
control of the republic, other forces were at work further
dividing authority and challenging moderate rule.

In

particular, the Indonesian communist party, buoyed by the
moderates' bungling of the independence process, was gaining
strength.

The failure of the Dutch to comply with the

Renville or Linggadjati Agreements had fueled
disillusionment with the policies of the Hatta government,
and the communists fed on this discontent.

The prime

minister's critics argued that the Republic had agreed to
Dutch occupation of its richest areas and the withdrawal of
Indonesia's best troops from strategic positions behind
Dutch lines and had gained no perceptible advantage in
return.

The Dutch proceeded to create a federal government

without the Indonesian republic's participation.

The

strategy of diplomasi seemed to only strengthen the Dutch. 33
On February 26, 1948, the major opposition parties
organized under the umbrella of the People's Democratic
Front (Front Demokrasi Rakjat, or FDR) led by former prime
minister Amir Sjarifuddin.

Their program, similar to Tan

Malaka in 1946, called for the repudiation of the Renville
Agreement, the cessation of all talks with the Dutch until
33 Kahin,

Nationalism and Revolution, 253-6; McMahon,
Colonialism and Cold War, 237-8.

73
their withdrawal from Indonesia, and the nationalization of
all Dutch and other foreign companies without compensation.
With support from some sections of the army, the
organization represented a serious challenge to moderate
rule. 34
The FDR's main argument was that the moderates had been
sold out by the United States.

Sjarifuddin, a signer of the

Renville Agreement, felt betrayed by American policy makers
since they had not ensured fair implementation of the
agreement. 35

The return of the legendary Communist leader

Musso to Indonesia in August provided the FDR with
leadership.

This man, who had led the communist uprising in

1926 and formed the underground PKI in 1935, consolidated
leftist forces to challenge moderate rule. 36
In a bid to rob the FDR of its ammunition against the
moderates, Cochran tried to bring both sides back to the
bargaining table.

It was too late.

The stonewalling Dutch

played on American fears of communism, making it a familiar
refrain in communications with American officials.
warnings were not without effect.

Their

Charles Reed, chief of

the State Department's Division of Southeast Asia Affairs,
counseled that:
34

Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 259-79.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

74

if the communists came to power in Indonesia,
the situation would be comparable to
Indochina ... Our need for strategic materials from
Southeast Asia may outweigh our desire for
independence of the indigenous population of the
area, if such independence is to be a pawn in the
hands of militant, organized, communists. 37
Dutch policy, in conjunction with the unwillingness of the
United States to withhold military aid to the Netherlands,
induced the next conflict within Indonesia. 38
A revitalized PK!, led by Musso and Tan Malaka and
demanding a change in diplomatic strategy from diplomasi to
perdjuangan, clashed with republican armed forces in
September 1948 in Surakarta.
to Manduin in East Java.

The communists then retreated

The Maduin Affair was crushed by

loyal military forces and Musso was killed.

Tan Malaka was

captured and executed. 39
Hatta used the opportunity presented him by the
communist rebellion.

By acting swiftly and firmly in

suppressing the insurgents, the rebels impressed elements of
the United States government.

Americans now recognized

37

Reed to Benninghoff (Office of Far Eastern Affairs),
August 27, 1948, 8560.00/8-2748, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
38

Actually the communist party (PK!) had only 3,000
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nationalist movement, but growing.
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39
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republicans as anti-communists and accordingly began to
pressure the Netherlands to accommodate itself to Indonesian
independence demands.

40

Before the Maduin Affair, Under

Secretary of State Robert Lovett said that the State
Department had been alarmed by the grave and immediate
Communist threat to Indonesia and" ... it appeared to us that
Indonesian nationalism must be accommodated in a just and
practical way as a condition precedent to dealing with
Communism. " 41

After the affair, Lovett duly noted that the

Indonesian Republic was the "only government in the Far East
to have met and crushed an all out Communist offensive." 42
To American policy makers, the successful defeat of the
Communist uprising by Indonesian nationalists made the Dutch
position increasingly untenable.

Asianists within the State

Department now pointed out that Indonesia was siding against
communism and deserved American support.
The fragile ruling Indonesian political coalition, even
after its survival of the Manduin Affair, was falling apart
from other internal stresses.

Hatta, the closest thing to a

conservative in the coalition, disagreed with Sukarno's idea
40
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41
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42
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of a Pan-Indonesia that would include Malaya, New Guinea and
the Philippines, and was against the most prominent
expansionists. 43

Mohammad Yamin, an expansionist, argued

that the Republic of Indonesia should cover the former Dutch
colonies, Portuguese Timar, North Borneo, the Malay
peninsula and all of New Guinea, as well as the Malaysian
states given to Thailand by the Japanese in 1943. 44

Hatta

disputed Yamin's claim that the Papuans on New Guinea were
the same race as the Indonesians and he was in favor of the
right of Papuans to independence as well as to an
independent Malaya. 45

However much in dispute, in the wake

of the Maduin Affair the strategy of diplomasi continued.

43

The Madjapahit Empire, the last of the Hindu-Javanese
kingdoms lasting into the sixteenth century, considered
itself to have supreme authority of a wide realm of islands
and mainland territory of Southeast Asia. The empire,
centered on Java, no doubt had a large psychological impact
on Sukarno.
In July 1945 Sukarno stated, "God in his wisdom
has mapped out this earth. Everyone looking at the world map
will understand what God has ordained as is shown on the map.
God has determined that certain parts of the world should
form single units-the British isles as one ... India surrounded
by the ocean below and Himalayas above .... And when I look at
the islands situated between Asia and Australia and between
the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, I understand that they are
meant to form a single entity.'' From Brian Crozier, SouthEast Asia in Turmoil (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, Inc., 1965),
113.
44
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On September 17 the Republic accepted the Cochran Plan,
a modification of the duBois-Critchley proposals.
was even more supportive of the Dutch position.

The plan
An elected

federal representative assembly would serve as an interim
government and constitutional assembly, and the Netherlands
representative retained veto power over the delegation.
Republicans on the main Indonesian island of Java were only
one of many states of a federal Indonesia and could not
control the new government.
The Dutch waited almost a full month to reply to the
latest GOC proposal.

On October 14 the Dutch agreed, but

attached so many conditions as to make their acquiescence
worthless. 46
inevitable. 47

Cochran now believed another crisis was
Hatta foresaw another military

confrontation. 48
The Dutch began to negotiate directly with Hatta and
the republican government, hoping to freeze out the GOC and
obtain a better deal.

Hatta offered major concessions to

the Netherlands officials on the nature of the interim
46

Taylor, Indonesian Independence, 146-53.

47

Cochran to Marshall, November 1, 4, 6, 1948, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1948, 6:
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48
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government and the powers the Dutch representative would
retain in the transition period, even sovereignty. 49
response was a harder line by the Dutch.
stalled.

The

The negotiations

On December 5, 1948, the Dutch delegation returned

to the Netherlands.

Once more, moderate conciliation only

cost the republic power among its constituents.
At this juncture the State Department now sent a blunt
aide-memoire to the Dutch implicitly stating that their
position threatened European Recovery Program aid.

It

contended that Dutch intransigence had lessened Hatta's
willingness to reach a compromise solution which in turn
fueled internal instability and the chance of another
communist coup attempt.

The letter reiterated the American

belief that "the preponderant desire of the Indonesian
people to govern themselves finds its chief expression in
the Republic of Indonesia,· which must be considered not as a
geographical concept but as a political force."

Hatta, who

acted "with skill and fortitude against the Communist
revolt," had recently "given evidence of his desire to
cooperate in a reasonable solution of the political
differences" between the respective parties.

Washington

warned that a resort to military measures "could seriously
deplete the resources of the Netherlands and tend to nullify
the effect of appropriations made to the Netherlands under
49

Taylor, Indonesian Independence, 154-5.
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the Economic Cooperation Administration. " 50 While the
January 17 threat to suspend aid was verbal, this threat was
written.

On December 10, the Dutch replied with an equally

blunt letter of their own to the State Department.

Another

outbreak of hostilities seemed certain.
Moderates under Hatta sought to defuse the crisis by
sending a letter to the Dutch delegation on December 13.
Rejecting the latest even more conciliatory offer, the Dutch
replied with an ultimatum.

On December 19, they launched

their second military offensive.

By mid-afternoon on the

nineteenth, the Dutch had captured the capital, Jogjakarta,
along with Sukarno, Hatta, and half of the Indonesian
cabinet.

The World condemned the Dutch offensive.

American

aid through the Economic Recovery Program enabled it.
With the Cochran proposal tabled by the second Dutch
military action, the Security Council now assumed direct
responsibility for the Indonesian-Dutch dispute from the
GOC.

American statements in the Council criticized the

Dutch, but only in a restrained fashion.

Acting American

ambassador to the United Nations, Philip Jessup, presented a
stronger U.S. position, condemning the Dutch action and
supporting the struggle of the Indonesian people,

50

Aide-memoire from Department of State to Netherlands
Embassy, December 7, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 6:
531-5.
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In light of recent events we now have a
situation in which the Security Council must feel
compelled to make recommendations.
The time has
passed for a piecemeal approach. The United
States can find no adequate justification for the
military action taken by the Netherlands in
Indonesia.
In many important respects, reasons
put forward by the Netherlands are not supported
by the Committee of Good Offices.
The Government
of the United States looks with admiration on the
efforts of the Indonesian people, both in the
Republic and elsewhere, to gain their independence
and has steadfastly sought to support them.
It
still takes that position, and it is for this
reason that it has taken the lead in endeavoring
in the Security Council and in the Good Offices
Committee to bring about a peaceful adjustment of
the difficulties between the Indonesian Republic
and the Netherlands and to establish the United
States of Indonesia as one of the fully sovereign
and independent states of the world. 51
Walter Lippman, the dean of American journalists,
described the beginning of the shift in United States policy
in his column of January 10, 1949:
Our friends in Western Europe should try to
understand why we cannot be maneuvered, why we
dare not drift, into general opposition to
independence movements in Asia.
They should tell
their propagandists to stop smearing these
movements.
They should try to realize how
disastrous it would be to them, and to the cause
of western civilization, if ever it could be said
that the western union for the defense of freedom
in Europe was in Asia a syndicate for the
preservation of decadent empires. 52
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United Nations Security Council, Official Records,
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Walter Lippman, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 10,
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The American position had come under attack, and for good
reason.

Dutch policy went against the United Nations

charter, alienated the American people, and alienated Asia.
The Soviet Union was using the American policy of support
for the Dutch as a springboard into the area.

Finally,

American actions reinforced Indonesian views of colonialism
and capitalism as one and the same.
American policy shifted.

The United States immediately

suspended ECA aid to Indonesia pending the settlement of the
dispute. 53

As far as the Indonesians were concerned, it was

not nearly enough and amounted to no more than token
pressure on the Dutch.

Sumitro Djojohadikusomo, acting head

of the republican delegation to the United Nations, charged
that American financial assistance to the Netherlands was
crucial.

In effect, the United States government was

financing the Dutch colonial war of suppression. 54

Sumitro

would later echo the feeling of other Indonesian
intellectuals by saying that in every case the United States

53
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suspension was largely symbolic because it effected only 14
million in aid.
In the meantime the Dutch had received 298
million.
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would place the interests of Europeans above the interest of
Asians. 55
The American position towards Indonesia now engendered
a public outcry in the United States.

Dean Rusk, director

of the Office of United Nations Affairs, still refused to
support sanctions against the Dutch, who continued mopping
up operations in the archipelago, to the dismay of many
other Asian nations.

On December 20 the government of India

reflected the views of all Asia in a bluntly worded aidememoire to the State Department.

The message complained

that Dutch Economic Recovery Program aid was being used to
oppose national freedom in Southeast Asia. "Intense popular
feelings roused against the Netherlands Government in
Indonesia ... have a tendency to become hostile to ... Marshall
Plan Aid. " 56
The American-supported Security Council resolutions of
December 24 and 28 were revealed as half-measures.

Events

would rapidly render the weak American response to the
crisis untenable.

Acting secretary Robert Lovett at the

State Department urged stronger American action to help the

55
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moderate government of Sukarno and Hatta.

The State

Department summarized:
In the course of the past few months, the
Department had come to believe that the SukarnoHatta Government might well constitute the last
bridge between the West and the Indonesian
nationalists.
Rather than scrap this bridge in
the probably futile hope that 9 million Dutch
would be able to control 75 million Indonesians
against the will of effective elements, wisdom had
appeared to require that on the basis of a
calculation of the obvious risks, the United
States should endeavor to persuade the Netherlands
to offer such concessions to the nationalist
movement as would have made possible an
agreement. 57

The most effective leverage was, and had always been,
suspension of Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands.
Suspension of aid risked a general break with the Dutch, but
Dean Rusk was unwilling to suspend aid. 58

Army Intelligence

stated that the sanctions against the Dutch would undermine
the military interests of the United States. 59

Thus,

American policy would continue to be one of pro-Dutch
neutrality even thoug0 it encouraged the spread of communism
57
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in Southeast Asia, dealt a blow to modern moderate Asian
nationalism, and risked the European Recovery Program.
In January 1949 the Security Council demanded the
reinstatement of the republican government.

In the

resolution of January 28, it asked the Netherlands to cease
all hostilities, release republican political prisoners,
resume negotiations with the Republic on the basis of
Linggadjati and Renville, and form an interim government to
be established by March 15, 1949.

Finally, the United

States and the United Nations pressured the Dutch to accept
a full transfer of authority to Indonesians by July 1,
1950. 60
American pressure increased as American policy makers
realized that European and Asian interests were not mutually
exclusive and that Dutch action was prolonging the
revolutionary struggle to the advantage of leftist
elements.

61

January 11.

Jessup condemned the second Dutch action on
Further encouraging U.S. pressure on the Dutch

was the introduction in the Senate of a resolution by Owen
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Brewster which called for the suspension of all Marshall
Plan aid to the Netherlands.~
Offered as an amendment to the bill extending the
Marshall Plan, Brewster's resolution now imperiled U.S. cold
war containment policy worldwide.

The resolution read,

Whereas the Royal Netherlands Government, on
December 19, 1948, in violation of her sworn
commitments under the Renville Agreement, signed
by the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia
aboard the U.S.S. Renville, January 17, 1948,
under the auspices of the United Nations Good
Offices Committee, did willfully and without
warning launch a military attack against the
Republic of Indonesia; and
Whereas the United Nations, on December 24, 1948
did order the Royal Netherlands Government to
cease hostilities forthwith; and
Whereas the Royal Netherlands Government did
ignore these orders of the united Nations Security
Council; Therefore be it
Resolved, that in full support of the foreign
policy of the United States and in support of the
United Nations, the President is hereby urged to
cause an immediate cessation of all financial aid,
through the E.C.A. or any other United States
Government Agency directly or indirectly to the
Royal Netherlands Government, in Europe as well as
in Indonesia, until the Royal Netherlands
62
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Government ceases hostilities against the
Indonesian Republic, withdraws her armed force to
her side of the demilitarized zones established
under the Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948,
and opens bona fide negotiations with the
Indonesian Republic under the terms of the
Renville Agreement. 63
While this resolution was being offered in the United States
Senate, Cochran continued to pressure Dutch officials in
Indonesia.

Dutch actions in Indonesia had set off

resentment in all of Asia and encouraged the growth of
communism.

64

The Dutch saw the handwriting on the wall.

Not only

had American pressure increased, but mounting Indonesian
guerrilla activity had placed Dutch troops on the defensive
by the end of January 1949. 65

On February 26 they offered a

compromise, accelerating the timetable for the transfer of
sovereignty.
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Realizing the
high probability of a second Dutch military offensive, the
Indonesian high command had reorganized the Indonesian army
just after the Linggadjati Agreement. The army.of 470,000
was divided into two groups: a well armed conventional army
and the lesser armed guerrillas to strike and run.
The goal
was to force a stalemate in the field.
Even though the Dutch
controlled all the major cities on Sumatra and Java, the
150,000 Dutch troops could not control the countryside.
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Initially, the Indonesians refused the Dutch offer.
Transfer of sovereignty was to be on Dutch terms.

The

republican government would not be restored before the
conference at The Hague.

Indonesian reluctance to negotiate

was buoyed by the unexpected decision of the heads of the
federal states (established by the Dutch) to support the
moderate republicans.

Even the Federalists appointed by the

Dutch considered Sukarno and Hatta to be the true
nationalist leaders.
While the United States government pressured ihe Dutch
to settle the dispute, it had still not halted Marshall Plan
aid.

New Dutch developments, along with increasing

criticism of Truman's Indonesian policy, created an
atmosphere of indecision in Washington.

Debate continued.

A principal point was that Marshall Plan aid to the
Netherlands equaled Dutch spending to sustain its military
effort against the Indonesian republic.

66

Former vice-

president Henry A. Wallace charged, "Marshall Plan aid had
been used to maintain_ Europe's colonial system by force of
arms." 67

In March, Senator George Aiken of Vermont asked,

"What good would the Atlantic Pact be in promoting the
safety and security of the United States if by.winking at
66
67
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the Dutch actions in Indonesia we force one billion
Orientals to look elsewhere for friendship and world
trade?" 68
By spring, the shift in American foreign policy
crystallized with the National Security Council release of
NSC-51 on March 29, 1949.

It flatly declared that,

"nineteenth century imperialism is no antidote to communism
in revolutionary colonial areas .... The satisfaction of
militant nationalism is the first essential requirement for
resistance to Stalinism."

NSC-51 called for "the creation

of a sovereign Indonesian state which will satisfy the
fundamental demands of militant nationalism in the
archipelago."

The document declared that, "the earliest

feasible transfer of authority from the Dutch to the
Indonesians is imperative, and will require additional
pressure on the Dutch.
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American businessmen agreed with the Council's
assessment.

H. L. Riddle of Goodyear Tire and Rubber
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Statement by Senator George Aiken, March 29, 1949, U.S.
Congress, Senate, 8lst congress, 1st session, Congressional
Record, 95:
3387.
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Company thought Indonesia the key to the whole Far East. 70
Standard Vacuum Oil Company sounded similar warnings: "Of
all the countries of the Far East, Indonesia is one of the
most important, if not the most important, from the
standpoint of strategic location and natural resources." 71
The moderates of the Indonesian republic had weathered
the storm.

Even NSC-51 labeled the Republic of Indonesia

government officials Sukarno and Hatta "essentially men of
moderation."

Their staunch anti-communism, proven in the

wake of the Manduin Uprising, undoubtedly helped their
cause. 72 The United States government was now ready to halt
all assistance to the Dutch.
Settlement of American-Dutch differences came quickly.
As State Department official Dean Acheson said about the
Dutch, "money talked. " 73

The United States could not let
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the Dutch directly threaten the survival of the centerpiece
of American foreign policy, the European Recovery Program,
through Senate passage of the Brewster amendment.
On April 14 negotiations reopened between republicans
and the Dutch, directed by the United Nations Commission on
Indonesia. Mohammed Rum, head of the republican delegation,
immediately insisted upon the restoration of the Indonesian
republic prior to the cease-fire.

The Dutch refused.

Cochran urged the republicans to offer key concessions.

As

a condition for the restoration of the republican government
in Jogjakarta, Sukarno and Hatta agreed to maintenance of
law and order and to participate in yet another conference
at The Hague.

The proposal did not call for Dutch

withdrawal from any of the areas overrun in the second
police action.

Further, republicans would make up only one

third of the delegates of the United States of Indonesia and
total only one of fifteen Indonesian states. This Dutch
federal structure, designed to freeze out republicans and
divide the nationalist movement, was still in place.
Sukarno, Hatta, and the majority of the republican leaders
reluctantly accepted the Cochran compromise proposal known
as the Rum-van Royen agreement. 74
While Indonesians were a step closer to independence,
moderate nationalists' acceptance of the Rum-van Royen
74
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agreement used up what little political capital they had
left.

Mohammed Natsir, a major nationalist leader who

emerged later as prime minister, resigned from the
delegation.

The Indonesian army was unhappy as well.

Army

officers felt the armed forces had brought the Dutch to the
table only to see the politicians surrender their hard-won
gains. The educated elite of the country viewed the
agreement as a result of Dutch bullying engineered by the
United States.

They felt moderate leaders had

capitulated. 75
But the moderates saw the agreement as a pragmatic
compromise on the way to independence.

Their realism made

them susceptible to attack from more radical elements, as is
often the case.

Realistic, but unpopular, decisions bred

dissension.
Even in the face of all of these difficulties, the
moderate nationalists' strategy of diplomasi, diplomacy over
armed aggression, triumphed.
Hatta returned to Jogjarkata.

On July 6, 1949, Sukarno and
On July 7, General Surdiman,

the leader of the Republic's armed forces and opponent of
the Rum-van Royen proposals, submitted his forces to the
civilian leadership of the Republic.

Leaders .of the other

federated states agreed that the republican government
should receive the transfer of sovereignty from the
75
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Netherlands. 76

The Dutch agreed to withdraw all troops.

Elections were to be held for a Constituent Assembly, and
The Roundtable Conference began August 23, 1949 at The
Hague. 77
The conference focused on three major issues:

the

Netherlands-Indonesian Union, the debt question, and control
of West Irian (West New Guinea).

Moderates would have to

compromise still more, and the United States, through
Cochran, was instrumental in forging an agreement.
The question of union first arose when T. B.
Simatupang, head of the republican delegation, stated that
the question of union was moot and that only a loose union
should be recognized.

The Dutch naturally wanted a closely

bound union under the queen. 78

Regardless of the wording,

the Republic would be independent and pursue its own foreign
policy.
The debt question was more difficult to solve, for each
side claimed the other owed money.

The Dutch said that the

republicans owed them approximately 6.1 billion guilders
76

By not giving the other fourteen states any real
responsibilities of government, the Dutch strategy of
splitting the nationalist movement along the lines of
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($1.73 billion).

The republicans countered that the Dutch

owed the Indonesians 540,000 guilders.

Cochran's view, that

Indonesian republicans owed 4.3 billion guilders, was
reluctantly accepted by both sides. 79

Once again the

moderates were forced to yield.
By October the only major stumbling block that remained
was West Irian.

The issue was highly emotional.

To

Indonesians, Dutch transfer of sovereignty meant transfer of
all sovereignty, and West Irian had been claimed as part of
the Indonesian archipelago as far back as the Madjahapit
dynasty.

The Dutch, wanting to retain an island so that

they could remain a Pacific power, argued that West Irian
was not a part of Indonesia.

Once again the moderates

compromised, leaving West Irian to the Dutch with free
elections to be held in one year.
The conference closed on November 2, 1949.

Indonesia

became a sovereign, independent state on December 27, 1949.
The strategy of diplomasi had finally secured independence,
but at the price of a fluid political environment.
Prolonged Dutch, British and now American intervention had
led to instability.

Coup attempts occurred as different

forces dueled for control within the country . . Neither the
left, nor the right, was happy with the moderate stance.
Moderates would be forced to choose sides, increasing
79
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instability and the nation's chances for experiencing
outside intervention.
Ultimately, American interpretation of Indonesian
politics also contributed to the likelihood of foreign
intervention in Indonesian affairs and prolongation of the
Indonesian cycle of uprisings.

American commitment to

Indonesian self-determination was limited.

Washington

wanted gradual evolutionary change that it could monitor and
control, not revolutionary change.

Initially it needed the

support of the Dutch in Europe, and (while publicly neutral)
was really pro-Dutch in outlook. It essentially underwrote
the colonial and oppressive policies of the Dutch in
Indonesia.
Only after the survival of the moderate nationalists
was assured, did the United States start to increase
pressure on the Dutch for talks.

American pressure did not

translate into effective policy until after the second Dutch
police action.

With NSC-51 American leaders finally looked

at long term interests in Asia.

NATO and Marshall Plan aid

had begun the reconstruction of Europe.

The Brewster

amendment, of course, would have jeopardized the plan.
Finally, the United States government took action in favor
of the Indonesians by threatening to suspend all Dutch aid.
Months later, Indonesia received its independence.
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But American cold warriors watched Indonesia closely.
As they saw it, the cold war must be a managed war.

It

required all nations to have a clear role on one side or the
other.

A bipolar world created win/lose situations and

America intervened often to promote its interests.
Indonesia was too important strategically

to lose to

communism.
Even though Indonesian culture was pre-disposed to
moderation (Unity in Diversity), exposure to interventions
and outside pressures extended revolutionary instability.
Internal disputes, coupled with superpower meddling, would
retard Indonesian progress toward stability and long term
growth as a nation.

Conclusion

Indonesia was never perceived as a threat or potential
threat to American security or economic interests.

As a

Dutch colony pursuing independence in the post World War II
period, it was not viewed as a close friend or ally.
Although American petroleum and mining interests had
significant investments in Indonesia, other investors were
not attracted to the archipelago.

This absence meant the

country's problems never resonated in the American
consciousness and received little coverage in the American
media.
Initial American-Indonesian relations were stormy, but
it would be unfair to blame only Sukarno for the trouble.
American policy was often at fault.

Indirect American

support for Dutch military offensives in Indonesia, which in
turn delayed Indonesian independence, did not bring about
stability, halt the leftward drift of the Indonesian
government, or improve the long term prospects for bilateral
relations.
While American support for Indonesia eventually led to
her independence from the Dutch, American actions were not
motivated by opposition to colonialism.
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The United States
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had initially sided with the Netherlands, believing the
support of an European ally was more dependable and
important than the support of Asian nationalists.

Only when

the Dutch themselves were the greatest threat to stability
in Indonesia, and continued Dutch military action threatened
the ability of the Marshall Plan to pass the Senate owing to
the Brewster amendment, did America shift its support to the
Republic.

American-European relations, and the American

military's need for bases in the Pacific, were always the
paramount considerations of American foreign policy during
and immediately following World War II and the Korean War.
American commitment to self-determination for the
people of Southeast Asia was always limited.

The

development of the cold war meant Washington favored
gradual, evolutionary changes that supported the
capitalist/colonialist status quo and limited violence and
instability.

The strategy of the Roosevelt and Truman

administrations was to use American power and prestige to
liberalize the imperialist system, to nudge European allies
toward native self-rule, but only at their own pace.
The emergence of a full blown nationalist movement with
the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia.by Sukarno and
Hatta on August 17, 1945, complicated United States
strategy. Initial American positioning alongside the Dutch
was unavoidable.

A trusted ally and friend of President
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Roosevelt, the Dutch monarchy was needed to stabilize
Western Europe in the face of the Soviet threat following
World War II.

The resulting dilemma caused a publicly

neutral United States to follow a contradictory policy that
cost much of the goodwill of Indonesian nationalists and
actually promoted instability in Indonesia while
contributing to stability in Europe.
By 1949 NSC-51 crystallized long-run American
objectives in Southeast Asia.

Stating that nineteenth-

century imperialism was no antidote to communism, it
recommended that the United States support Indonesian
independence; yet European factors and the cold war outlook
still dominated American decision making.

Finally, Dutch

intransigence threatened European stability by jeopardizing
the European Recovery Program in the United States Senate.
At no point, even when America supported Indonesian
independence, was State Department policy tied to Asian
nationalism.
The unwillingness to allow Indonesian nationalism
greater influence in United States-Indonesian relations was
reflected in subsequent American actions in the 1950s.
These actions decreased chances of a moderate _Indonesian
government that might abbreviate the period of political
turmoil and avoid a leftward drift toward communism.
Sukarno, however manipulative, found himself led, driven and
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pulled leftward by internal and external forces he could not
hope to harness, no matter how strong his desire to remain
in power.

American policy had the effect of ensuring long

term instability.
In the final analysis, an examination of United StatesIndonesian relations during the years 1945-1949 demonstrates
the attraction of American ideology.

Sukarno and Hatta were

motivated by American revolutionary principles.

The vision

inspired by these ideals created much goodwill at little
cost, goodwill that was lost over time by American actions.
Ideology, as proven by the Reagan administration's
prosecution of the cold war, can be an inspirational and
powerful tool to promote the national interests of a nation,
and cost effective too.

In a multipolar world, and in the

presence of budget cutbacks for the United States, those
might be wise words indeed.
As critical as these observations seem, American
foreign policy made sense.

The most important areas

strategically to the United States were Western Europe,
China, and Japan, and resources to expend on these goals
were finite.
paramount.

The stability of these areas remained
American strategy often seemed at .odds with

Indonesian national interests, but it was American pressure
on the Dutch

that did enable her independence.

While the

State Department initially favored the Dutch position,
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continuing to do so for a protracted period of time,
American foreign policy experts ultimately changed tactics
and strongly encouraged the Dutch to return to the
bargaining table by threatening to suspend European Recovery
Program aid.

At no point were relations allowed to

deteriorate to the extent that they did in French Indochina.
Yet this American attempt to practice "realpolitik" had
its drawbacks.

Indonesia provides an excellent case study

in the negative effects even carefully calculated foreign
policy strategies bring about.
negative consequences.

All policy has positive and

American policy in Indonesia

reflected concern for European stability and a desire to
halt the spread of communist influence.

American policy

makers made mistakes, but ultimately these were
surmountable. The United States-Indonesian relationship was
one of calculated risks and negative consequences in the
American pursuit of an overall strategy of containment in
the cold war period that happily did not degenerate into
military conflict and disaster.
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